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SYMPOSIU."
NIKE V. KASKY AND THE MODERN
COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE
FOREWORD
THE LANDMARK FREE-SPEECH CASE
THAT WASN'T:
THE NIKE V. KASKY STORY*
Ronald K.L. Collinst and David M. Skovertt
A Term highlighted by constitutional rulings of lasting
significance also produced one monumental
disappointment-a dud....
--Thomas C. Goldstein'
©2004 Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover.
t Scholar, First Amendment Center, Arlington, Virginia. In the interest of full disclosure,
I note that I was approached early on by Mr. Jim Carter, Vice President and General Counsel for
Nike, to discuss the case with my colleague, Paul McMasters, while review was pending in the
U.S. Supreme Court. I did not, however, request or accept any remuneration, and was not in-
volved in the litigation of the case. In the course of that litigation, I spoke pro bono to several
lawyers involved in the case, people like Walter Dellinger (representing Nike) and David
Vladeck (supporting Kasky's position).
tt Professor, Seattle University School of Law.
I Thomas C. Goldstein, Nike v. Kasky and the Definition of "Commercial Speech,"
2002-2003 CATO SUp. CT. REV. 63, 63. Mr. Goldstein was one of Nike's three main lawyers,
joined by Laurence Tribe and Walter Dellinger, in the United States Supreme Court.
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Nike, Inc. v. Kasky2 was the landmark First Amendment case
that wasn't.
What a specter: a bevy of renowned lawyers, thousands of
pages of briefs, extended time for oral arguments, incessant hype,
almost unprecedented editorial buzz, and endless pundit predic-
tions. When the jurisdictional dust finally settled, however, the
telling United States Supreme Court caption read: "The writ of
certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted."3 Nike had fallen
from the "cert. granted" docket; the mighty cause of the winged-
corporate goddess had collapsed. Myth had succumbed to reality,
the reality that corporate speakers could be held to legal account
for "political" statements let loose in America's marketplace of
ideas.
Yet there is a lesson here, in this landmark that remains a con-
troversy while not a significant precedent. Actually, there are sev-
eral lessons-about law and how it is practiced, about how proce-
dure can trump substance, about the character and future of the
First Amendment, and about how all of this plays out in the lives
of foreign workers, American consumers, and those for whom the
majesty of the law is never quite majestic enough. Such themes
and others, enveloped in legal doctrine, constitutional theory,
commercial reality, and political debate, inform the discourse of
this Symposium. That discourse explains why Nike v. Kasky is a
rich case study in how American law does and does not work.
Some of the contributors to this Symposium sided in court
with Nike, some with Kasky, and some stayed out of the litigation
altogether, for whatever reasons. Hence, in what follows, the
reader is offered a surfeit of views from practitioners, partisans,
and professors. This combination of practice and theory provides
something frequently not found in law reviews: real-world law les-
sons coupled with conceptual prophecies of where the course of
the law is tending. It is, we think, a good mix.
This is a story about the First Amendment. It begins in a
humble place, a shoe factory in Vietnam; and its beginnings belie
its complexity. The story is colored by good and bad, right and
wrong, knowledge and ignorance, political rancor and corporate
PR, and just enough doubt to give legal theorists and practitioners
pause.
2 123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003).
3 Id. at 2554.
[Vol. 54:4
2004] THE LANDMARK FREE-SPEECH CASE THAT WASN'T 967
The Nike story pits a strong-willed political activist against a
multi-national corporation. The conflict centered on charges of
"sweatshop" labor practices abroad. As it escalated, many nota-
bles were drawn into the fray-Philip Knight, Nike's CEO; Bob
Herbert, New York Times columnist; Michael Jordan, basketball
superstar; Andrew Young, former U.N. ambassador; Walter
Dellinger, former U.S. acting Solicitor General; and Laurence
Tribe, noted Harvard law professor, among others. It was a con-
troversy argued in the press and in the courts.
"[T]he most powerful actors in our society-largely corpora-
tions-are wielding the First Amendment in ways that often seem
counter to [progressive] goals."4 So warned the editors of The Na-
tion in July, 1997, in a symposium entitled "Speech & Power."
The problem, in the progressive eye, was that yesterday's free
speech principles have become today's power principles-for the
powerful. The First Amendment, so the charge goes, has become
yet another weapon in the arsenal of the captains of commerce, a
weapon to be used against the powerless. For that arsenal, Nike
was a case marked with dangerous potential. The Supreme Court
decision might move away from the liberal First Amendment, in-
tended to empower the powerless, and towards a laissez-faire First
Amendment, intended to embolden the powerful.
For some liberals, libertarians, and conservatives, the Nike
controversy had less to do with corporate power than with consti-
tutional principle. After all, the great marketplace-of-ideas princi-
ple is betrayed when corporate critics hurl barbs but corporations
cannot speak back. Moreover, could the First Amendment mean-
ingfully exist in a capitalist culture without safeguarding corporate
speech? Accordingly, these free-speech advocates also saw great
potential in Nike, but of an affirmative nature. That is, they hoped
the case would become the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan5 coun-
terpart for commercial speech.
Our Foreword sets out to explore those perspectives by way of
an account of a man who raised a lance against a corporate Goli-
ath. In order to give a measure of context, the pages that follow
provide a sketch of the history of the case and of the First
Amendment arguments that grew out it. Part I tells the back-
ground stories that brought the Nike v. Kasky players to the steps
of the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court's action and the settlement
that its resolution inspired are the subjects of Part II. The princi-
4 Editorial, Speech & Power: Is First Amendment Absolutism Obsolete?, NATION, July
21, 1997, at 11.
5 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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ples and perspectives at tension in the Nike controversy are dis-
cussed in Part III, as well as the ways in which the Symposium
participants address that tension. And finally, in Part IV, we
briefly chart our own takes on the lessons of the Nike story-legal,
political, and cultural-and usher in our Symposium contributors.
I. NIKE NARRATIVES
A. The Sweatshop Story
6
Jurgis talked lightly about work, because he was young.
They told him stories about the breaking down of men, there
in the stockyards of Chicago, and of what had happened to
them afterwards-stories to make your flesh creep.
-- Upton Sinclair, The Jungle
7
Lap worked in the Samyang shoe factory in 1996. She was
twenty-eight years old. Similar to 25,000 other workers in five
Vietnam shoe factories, she worked six days a week for about $40
a month. Like her co-workers, mostly women between the ages of
fifteen and twenty-eight, she was part of a workforce hired by Ko-
rean subcontractors to produce shoes for Nike, a million shoes a
month. Overtime work, well beyond the legal limit, was part of
her world. "You have to meet the quota before you go home," she
lamented.
The noise levels were high and the concentrations of toluene,
a chemical that wreaks havoc on reproductive organs, were higher
6 Many of the facts in this account are documented in Kasky's complaint in Kasky v.
Nike, Inc., filed in the California Superior Court in San Francisco. Complaint, Kasky v. Nike,
Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002) (No. 994446), available at http://www.corpwatch.org/issues/
PRT.jsp?articleid=3448; First Amended Complaint, Nike (No. 99446); Bob Herbert, Brutality in
Vietnam, N.Y. TIMES, March 28, 1997, at A29, LEXIS, News & Business, News, By Individ-
ual Publication, N, The New York Times (discussing International Women's Day) [hereinafter
Brutality in Vietnam]; Bob Herbert, Nike Blinks, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1998, at A33, LEXIS,
News & Business, News, By Individual Publication, N, The New York Times (discussing work-
ing conditions and firing) [hereinafter Nike Blinks]; Vietnam Labor Watch, Nike Labor Prac-
tices in Vietnam (March 20, 1997), at http://www.cleanclothes.org/companies/nikevlw.htm;
Henry Weinstein, California Legal Team Takes Aim at Nike, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1998, at D2,
LEXIS, News & Business, News, News Group File, All (discussing working conditions includ-
ing toluene exposure); 48 Hours: Controversy Surrounds Nike as Exclusive Investigation Re-
veals Abuse of Workers in Foreign Countries and Very Low Wages (CBS News Transcripts,
Oct. 17, 1996), LEXIS, News & Business, News, Transcripts (depicting Nike factory in
Samyang, Vietnam); 48 Hours: Investigation into Nike 's Overseas Operations Three Years Ago
Brought About Change; Nike Expands by Moving to Vietnam and Paying Lower Wages, (CBS
News Transcripts, Oct. 17, 1996), LEXIS, News & Business, News, Transcripts, (depicting
factories in Djakarta, Indonesia, and Vietnam).
7 UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE 21 (James Barrett ed., Univ. Ill. Press 1988).
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still. Some women fainted from exhaustion, heat, or just poor nu-
trition as they struggled through an eight-hour shift on the "boot
camp assembly line[s]." 8 The factories operated twenty hours a
day and were staffed with one doctor and two nurses for every
6,000 employees. Workers were permitted to go to the bathroom
only once, though they were allowed two drinks of water during
that period. Drinking water and using the toilet were controlled by
a card or hat system in which a supervisor had to first assign a card
or hat to a worker. Only those women who wore the prescribed
hat or carried the required card could avail themselves of such
privileges. While women could not bring their lunch, they could
buy lunch at company prices high enough to deprive them of much
of their daily wage. "I have lost my strength," said Lap, "and
some weight, 17 pounds." She weighed eighty-five pounds.
Behind the factory walls and closed doors, there was abuse-
physical, psychological, and sexual. On one occasion, forty-five
women were made to kneel on the ground with their hands in the
air for twenty-five minutes. "They treat us like animals," one
woman complained. Once, on International Women's Day, fifty-
six women workers were punished; they were forced to run around
the factory in the hot sun. Some suffered shock and fainted, while
twelve others were carried off by their co-workers to the hospital
emergency room. Ironically, on that day most companies in Viet-
nam gave flowers to female workers. On yet another occasion,
punishment for worker lapses took on a different form: women
were lined up by their supervisors and hit in the face and the head.
"The physical pain didn't last long," recalled Lap's co-worker
Twi, "but the pain I feel in my heart will never disappear."
Before Lap's experiences in 1996, workers in Djakarta en-
dured a similar fate. After CBS News exposed their plight in
1993, Nike moved its operations to Vietnam. Things had not im-
proved much by the time CBS's Roberta Baskin interviewed Lap
and her co-workers in 1996. Nor had they improved much by the
time that Vietnam Labor Watch issued its incriminating 1997 re-
port about life in Nike factories. True, Nike had relatively good
codes of conduct. But they were honored more in the breach. It
was also true that Phil Knight, Nike's CEO, had said in January,
1996, that Nike takes "full responsibility for working conditions
wherever its products are produced." 9 But here, too, the promise
8 Vietnam Labor Watch, supra note 6.
9 Jim Lobe, Nike Brought to Court over False Ads, IPS-INTER PRESS SERV., April 21,
1998, LEXIS, News & Business, News, All (discussing Knight's statement, as quoted in
Kasky's complaint).
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was never actually realized, at least not in the eyes of Nike's crit-
ics. One of those critics was a syndicated columnist determined to
expose Nike's practices to public examination.
Nike executives "are not bothered by the cries of the op-
pressed."10 So wrote New York Times columnist Bob Herbert in
one of three 1996 columns he authored blasting Nike." Reports of
inhumane labor practices abroad drew his editorial ire. The
American side of this story begins there, with a newspaper man
exercising his First Amendment rights by holding a multi-national
company's feet to the editorial fire. Before the flames could cool,
and in much the same spirit, CBS' 48 Hours followed suit with its
own documented news report filed by Roberta Baskin. Herbert's
columns and Baskin's expos6 set things in motion for more inter-
national attention, more bad press. The news stories fired up hu-
man-rights activists like Vietnam Labor Watch, which in March,
1997, issued a report highly critical of Nike's labor practices in
Vietnam. 12  The report, based on a six-month investigation of
Vietnam shoes factories and interviews with Vietnamese workers,
further described and documented "appalling" conditions at Nike
plants. Among other things, the report called on President Clinton
to intervene. By April, 1998, the situation had become so bad that
Footwear News declared: "Like a mutant zombie from an old B-
movie, the controversy surrounding Nike's overseas factory work-
ers refuses to die."'
' 3
Nike denied the charges, vigorously. It launched major cam-
paigns to counter the allegations; it launched others to remedy any
existing problems.' 4 At least, so it said. Meanwhile, the world's
news media rushed to find yet more incriminating evidence of
10 Bob Herbert, Nike's Bad Neighborhood, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1996, at A29, LEXIS,
News & Business, News, By Individual Publication, N, The New York Times.
1 Bob Herbert, Nike's Pyramid Scheme, N.Y. TIMEs, June 10, 1996, at A17, LEXIS,
News & Business, News, By Individual Publication, N, The New York Times [hereinafter
Nike's Pyramid Scheme]; Nike's Bad Neighborhood, supra note 10; Bob Herbert, From Sweat-
shops to Aerobics, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1996, at A15, LEXIS, News & Business, News, By
Individual Publication, N, The New York Times. Mr. Herbert went on to write six more edito-
rials on the Nike overseas labor controversy: Brutality in Vietnam, supra note 6; Bob Herbert,
Nike's Boot Camps, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1997, at A15 [hereinafter Nike's Boot Camps]; Bob
Herbert, A Good Start, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1997, at A]7 [hereinafter A Good Start]; Bob Her-
bert, Mr. Young Gets It Wrong, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1997, at A29, LEXIS, News & Business,
News, By Individual Publication, N, The New York Times [hereinafter Mr. Young Gets It
Wrong]; Nike Blinks, supra note 6; Bob Herbert, Let Nike Stay in the Game, N.Y. TIMES, May 6,
2002, at A21 [hereinafter Let Nike Stay in the Game]. Importantly, in the last editorial, Mr.
Herbert wrote to defend Nike's First Amendment rights.
12 Vietnam Labor Watch, supra note 6.
13 Greg Melville, California Suit Latest Shot at Nike Labor: On Heels of Movie, TV
Probes, Nike Says It Doesn't 'Whine'; Treatment of Asian Workers, FooTwEAR NEws, Apr. 27,
1998, at 2, LEXIS, News & Business, News, News Group File, All.
14 See infra at 975-76.
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sweatshop practices.' 5 Reporters from the Oregonian16 to Mother
Jones17 jumped on the sweatshop-news bandwagon. One of those
reporters, Steven Greenhouse of the New York Times, later filed a
long story about Nike's labor practices in Vietnam. In that article,
a Nike spokesperson was quoted as saying, "Nike workers earn
superior wages and manufacture product under superior condi-
tions. ' 8  That story caught Marc Kasky's eye. First, it angered
him, and then it inspired him to go after Nike.
B. The Activist's Story
I saw something that I thought was wrong, and I wanted to
do something about it.
-- Marc Kasky 19
Marc Kasky is a jogger and former marathoner; at one time in
his life he wore Nike shoes. He is also a political activist, an envi-
ronmentalist, and the guy who once sued AT&T, Pillsbury, and
Nestle Beverage Co., among others. 20  He was so enraged by Ste-
ven Greenhouse's New York Times story that he called his friend
Alan Caplan.21 What could be done to force Nike to tell the truth
about how it was treating its foreign workers? What could be done
to bring Nike to its knees?
Caplan, a noted California class-action lawyer who always
relished a clash with a corporate giant, had an idea. They would
sue the footwear company under California's unfair business prac-
15 See, e.g., Vietnam Makers of Nike Shoes Deny Charges of Labour Mistreatment,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Mar. 28, 1997, LEXIS, News and Business, News, By Individual
Publication, A, Agence France Presse-English; Eric C. Fleming, Nike Criticized for Labor Prac-
tices, NEWS, Mar. 29, 1997, LEXIS, News & Business, News, News Group File, All.
16 See NAOMI KLEIN, No LOGO 367-68 (2002).
17 See Keith Hammond, Leaked Audit: Nike Factory Violated Worker Laws, Nov. 7, 1997,
at http://www.motherjones.com/newswire/nike.html.
IS Steven Greenhouse, Nike Shoe Plant in Vietnam Is Called Unsafe for Workers, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 8, 1997, at Al, LEXIS, News & Business, News, By Individual Publication, N, The
New York Times.
19 Steve Rubenstein, Marc Kasky; S.F. Man Changes from Customer to Nike Adversary,
S.F. CHRON., May 3, 2002, at A6, LEXIS, News & Business, News, By Individual Publication,
S, The San Francisco Chronicle.
20 Id.; Christian Plumb, Phone Firms Sued over Long-Distance Telephone Charges;
Class-Action Case Sought Against Billing Policy, S.F. ExAM'R, Oct. 21, 1995, at D2, LEXIS,
News & Business, News, By Individual Publication, S, San Francisco Examiner (discussing
class action against AT&T, MCI, and Sprint); Melville, supra note 13 (discussing suits against
Pillsbury and Nestle).
21 Californian Sues Nike Inc. over Asian Labor Conditions, S.F. EXAM'R, Apr. 22, 1998
LEXIS, News & Business, News, By Individual Publication, S, San Francisco Examiner [here-
inafter Californian Sues Nike].
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tices statute,22 which prohibits "any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent
business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading
advertising., 23 Caplan had earlier won a major case against R.J.
Reynolds under the same law. That victory prevented Reynolds
from using Joe Camel ads in California. The tobacco giant also
agreed to pay $10 million for an anti-smoking campaign in the
state. 24
Thus Kasky v. Nike began as a consumer action filed in the
San Francisco Superior Court on April 20, 1998.25 There, in a
court normally the home of personal injury, business, and divorce
lawsuits, a landmark case would begin. The suit accused Nike and
five of its officers and/or directors, including CEO Phil Knight, of
misleading consumers about how it treated foreign workers.
Tracking what the Vietnam Labor Watch report had done a year
earlier, Kasky and Caplan compiled a list of Nike's alleged human
rights violations at its Asian facilities and paired that list against a
list of Nike's corresponding exculpatory statements. Among other
things, the suit charged that Nike misled the public when it:
* denied that its Asian factory workers were not sub-
ject to corporal punishment;
* claimed that products in those factories were made in
accordance with applicable government wage and
hour laws;
" alleged that Nike pays production workers on aver-
age twice the minimum wage in Southeast Asian
countries; and
* alleged that workers who make Nike products re-
ceive free meals and health care.
While the complaint relied on no first-hand accounts, it did
draw on various human rights reports, credible news stories, and
even a 1997 internal audit of the company prepared by the ac-
counting firm of Ernst & Young.26 The leaked audit described
22 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200-17209 (West 2000).
23 Id. § 17200.
24 Gina Binole, California Lawsuit Against Nike Could Be a Problem, Bus. J., May 1,
1998.
2 See Stephanie Armour, California Lawsuit Takes Nike to Task, USA TODAY, Apr. 21,
1998, at 4B, LEXIS, News & Business, News, News Group Fill, All (documenting the Superior
Court complaint); V. Dion Haynes, Nike Hit with Suit on Labor Practices, CHI. TRiB., Apr. 21,
1998, at NI; Weinstein, supra note 6; Nike Accused of Lying About Asian Factories, N.Y.
TiMEs, Apr. 21, 1998, at A18, LEXIS, News & Business, News, By Individual Publication, N,
The New York Times; Scott Winokur, Suit Hits Nike on Labor Abuses, S.F. EXAM'R, Apr. 21,
1998, at A6, LEXIS, News & Business, News, By Individual Publication, S, San Francisco
Examiner.
26 See, e.g., Greenhouse, supra note 18; Hammond, supra note 17.
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health and safety violations at a shoe factory in Vietnam. Its find-
ings were used to contradict Nike's self-exonerating PR.
The remedy sought by Kasky and Caplan for the alleged
wrongs was not simply disgorgement of profits realized due to
Nike's violations. Hardly. The plaintiff asked the court to moni-
tor a "public information campaign to correct alleged misstate-
ments" about Nike's labor practices.27 In other words, if Nike lost,
it would be forced to pay for anti-Nike messages on commercials
and billboards. Worse still, Nike's fate was to be in the hands of
twelve lay people, as Kasky requested a jury trial.
Consistent with that request, the complaint was signed and
captioned as if it were a populist document: "MARC KASKY, on
Behalf of the General Public of the State of California., 28  Nota-
bly, Kasky alleged "no harm or damages whatsoever regarding
himself individually,, 29 and alleged no specific injury sustained by
any members of the public. 30  In essence, the self-designated pri-
vate attorney general was suing over Nike's negligent misrepresen-
tations of fact, pure and simple.3' Predictably, as soon as the
Kasky complaint was filed it became banner news.
"Californian Sues Nike, Inc. over Asian Labor Conditions. 32
That headline in the San Francisco Examiner was especially
disturbing to many of the city's inhabitants. It was likewise trou-
bling to people of all walks of life who saw similar headlines in
numerous other papers. Radio and television followed suit with
their own stories, replete with photos of Swooshes and sweatshops.
In Nike's eyes, however, it was all media hype. "[T]he action as
27 Weinstein, supra note 6.
28 Complaint, Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002) (No. 994446). Any California
citizen may bring suit under the California unfair business practices law to enforce its provi-
sions. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17204 (West 2000).
29 Complaint at 6, Nike (No. 994446).
30 The California unfair business practices statute has been interpreted to require no alle-
gation of personal injury by the plaintiff. See Gregory v. Albertson's Inc., 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d
389, 392 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). Nor is there any requirement that the plaintiff, or the public at
large, actually relied on the company's misrepresentations. See Klein v. Earth Elements, Inc.,
69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 623, 626 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) ("Unlike common law fraud, a section 17200
violation can be established even if no one was actually deceived, relied upon the fraudulent
practice or sustained any damage.").
31 Neither Kasky's complaint nor arguments made in briefs to the appellate courts during
the entire litigation process characterized Nike's misrepresentations as "lies" made with actual
malice (i.e., with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth). Accordingly, the case
alleged no more than Nike's negligence in making its contested statements. See Nike, Inc. v.
Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554, 2556-57 (2003) (Stevens, J., concurring) (recognizing that Kasky would
have to amend his complaint to allege any claim more serious than negligent misrepresentation).
32 Califomian Sues Nike, supra note 21.
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filed," according to a Nike press statement, "appears to be . . . a
press release dressed up like a lawsuit."
33
Was there any merit to Marc Kasky's allegations? What was
true and what was false? Why did Nike's lawyers never go to
court and seek protection under California's anti-SLAPP laws?
34
Whatever the answer to such questions, the Kasky and Caplan plan
was nonetheless ingenious and provocative: take Nike to court and
let it wage its PR campaign under oath. And if it was unable to do
so, then the court would compel it to speak the truth in public ser-
vice announcements. The idea to take the debate out of the public
realm and into the courtroom, along with the requested remedy,
raised a thorny issue: whether the First Amendment permitted the
government to interfere in this debate about shoes and sweatshops.
C. The Nike Story
For the past 25 years, Nike has provided good jobs,
improved labor practices and raised standards of living
wherever we operate.
-- Phil Knight, Nike CEO
35
For the fiscal year ending May 31, 1997, Nike had annual
revenues of $9.2 billion.36 During that same period, it spent almost
33 Weinstein, supra note 6.
34 SLAPP stands for Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation. See CAL. CIv.
PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2000). In relevant part, section 425.16(b) provides:
(1) A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in
furtherance of the person's right of petition or free speech under the United
States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be
subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the
plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will pre-
vail on the claim. (2) In making its determination, the court shall consider
the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon
which the liability or defense is based. (3) If the court determines that the
plaintiff has established a probability that he or she will prevail on the
claim, neither that determination nor the fact of that determination shall be
admissible in evidence at any later stage of the case, and no burden of proof
or degree of proof otherwise applicable shall be affected by that determina-
tion.
Curiously, Nike did not avail itself of this remedy. Why not? Did it believe it could not pre-
vail? If so, what does that suggest?
When a similar type of action was brought against a public interest group, a California
judge issued a telephonic ruling in 2002, dismissing a SLAPP suit under authority of California
Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16; see Bernardo v. Planned Parenthood Fed'n, No. GIC772552
(Cal. Super. Ct. 2002), affd, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 197 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
35 Nike Joins President Clinton's Fair Labor Coalition, PR NEWSWIRE, Aug. 2, 1996,
LEXIS, News & Business, News, News, All.
36 The facts in this paragraph regarding Nike's 1997 revenues and promotional costs and
sports players wearing Nike shoes derive from Complaint, Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (Cal.
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$1 billion promoting and advertising its athletic products. Well
over 200 of 324 NBA players wore Nike shoes, as did 275 pro
football players and 290 Major League Baseball players. All that
money, product placement, and hard-earned goodwill were put in
jeopardy when Marc Kasky's headline-grabbing complaint ma-
ligned the Nike name.
Any bad news that is fit to print can slay a corporate giant.
The folks at Nike knew that, their stockholders knew it, their pub-
lic relations department knew it, and their lawyers knew it. How
should the company respond to the New York Times columns and
stories? 37 To the 48 Hours expos6 aired in October 1996?38 To the
1997 Vietnam Labor Watch report on the distressing conditions in
its factories? 39 And to all those nasty "gotcha" articles in the USA
Today, Los Angeles Times, New York Times, San Francisco Exam-
iner, Chicago Tribune and so many others?n° Then there was col-
umnist Bob Herbert, who seemed relentless in his syndicated cam-
paign to "nail" Nike for its labor practices abroad.4'
Nike countered, forcefully and impressively. Among its many
PR tactics, Nike tapped the Michael Jordan persona to act as one
of its spokespersons.42 It joined President Clinton's task force, the
Apparel Industry Partnership, and signed on to its Workplace Code
of Conduct to ameliorate substandard conditions in foreign facto-
ries. 43 It held press conferences by telephone with eighteen col-
lege newspaper staffs and sent letters to the presidents and athletic
directors of colleges that purchased its products, in order to assure
them that Nike was a brand that their sports teams could still wear
proudly. 4 And it hired the revered Andrew Young, civil rights
leader and former U.N. ambassador, to investigate working condi-
tions in Nike's Asian factories.45 After visiting some factories,
2002) (No. 994446). Aspects of the complaint are discussed by the California Supreme Court in
Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 247-49 (Cal. 2002), cert. granted, 537 U.S. 1099 (2003), and
cert. dismissed, 123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003).
37 See supra notes 6, 10-11, 18, 25.
38 See supra note 6.
39 See Vietnam Labor Watch, supra note 6.
40 See supra notes 6, 10-11, 18-21, 25.
41 See supra notes 6, 10-11.
42 See Harvey Araton, Athletes Toe the Nike Line, But Students Apply Pressure, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 22, 1997, at C3, LEXIS, News & Business, News, By Individual Publication, N,
The New York Times.
43 See WALTER LAFEBER, MICHAEL JORDAN AND THE NEW GLOBAL CAPITALISM 148-49
(2002); A Good Start, supra note 11.
44 Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 854, 857 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (discussing letter to
presidents and athletic directors); Michael Hines, Nike Denies Claims of Unfair Labor Prac-
tices, OR. DAILY EMERALD, Oct. 15, 1997, http://www.dailyemerald.comarchive/v99/1/
971015/nike.html.
45 Araton, supra note 42.
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Young issued a report that said in part: "'It is my sincere belief
that Nike is doing a good job ... but [that] Nike can and should do
better.' ,'46 Nike ran with the "news," taking out full-page ads in
the nation's major newspapers. 47 But Bob Herbert was not satis-
fied: "Oh brother. The kindest thing that can be said at this point
is that Mr. Young was na'fve . . . [for he says nothing about]
wretchedly low wages, enforced overtime, harsh and sometimes
brutal discipline, and corporal punishment. 48
As if this were not enough, Marc Kasky, Alan Caplan, and
their publicity-grabbing lawsuit were looming. Raising the ante
still higher, they vowed to go to Asia, conduct their own investiga-
tion, and compare their findings with Nike's self-exonerating
claims. How could Nike make all of this disappear, and quickly?
D. The ACLU Story
[W]hy is the ACLU devoting resources to argue that
transnational corporations like Nike should enjoy
Bill of Rights protections?
-- Jeff Milchen, Director, ReclaimDemocracy.org49
When Marc Kasky filed his lawsuit against Nike, Ann Brick
was a lawyer for the Northern California chapter of the American
Civil Liberties Union.5° In time, she would file papers defending
Nike-actually, defending Nike's First Amendment right to be free
of lawsuits of the kind brought by Kasky. 5 As a child of the '60s
revolution and a graduate of the University of California Law
School at Berkeley, 52 Brick shared Kasky's commitment to im-
proving the plight of the poor and oppressed; she valued his will-
ingness to go after international corporate wrongdoers; and she
very much respected the fact that he spoke out. But another value
was at stake here: free expression, namely, Nike's right to respond
to its critics' charges without being hauled off to court. Sensitive
to that value, Ann Brick took up legal arms against Marc Kasky.
46 Mr. Young Gets It Wrong, supra note 11; see also LaFeber, supra note 43, at 149 (dis-
cussing Young's report on Nike's factories).
47 Mr. Young Gets It Wrong, supra note 11.
48 Id.
49 Jeff Milchen, ACLU & Nike vs. Reason, May 15, 2002, at http://reclaimdemocracy.org/
nike-aclu-corporate-speech.html.
50 See Martindale.com Lawyer Locator, Ann Brick, at http:/lawyers.martindale.com (last
visited Apr. 17, 2004).
51 See infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
52 See Martindale.com Lawyer Locator, supra note 50.
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Her endorsement of Nike's commercial speech rights was consis-
tent with the national ACLU's position. But that position had not
gone without challenge in the progressive community.
In July, 1992, internal Philip Morris, Inc., papers documenting
substantial financial grants to the American Civil Liberties Union
were leaked to Britain's Yorkshire Television.53 The Yorkshire
show caught the attention of retired journalist Morton Mintz, who
had assumed that the ACLU had opposed tobacco-ad restrictions at
a time when it had no monetary links to tobacco corporations. In-
stead, Mintz discovered that over a six-year period, Philip Morris
had donated $500,000 to an ACLU foundation that had solicited
the grants. The Mintz report led to a press conference on July 29th
featuring consumer advocate Ralph Nader and Sidney Wolfe, Di-
rector of Public Citizen Health Research Group, who called on the
ACLU to resist contributions from Big Tobacco. "We have been
baffled by the seemingly inconsistent position of the ACLU on the
issue of commercial speech," said Scott Ballin, a coalition mem-
ber.
The flap continued, the ACLU responded vigorously,54 and
America's most famous civil liberties group went on to support,
over strong objection, the commercial free-speech rights of to-
bacco, alcohol, and other corporate giants, including Nike. Kasky
v. Nike, somewhat like the 1978 Skokie case,55 thus divided the
liberal community.
The ACLU of Northern California submitted amicus briefs in
support of Nike, first in the California courts and later in the U.S.
Supreme Court.56 Outside of judicial forums, moreover, the
ACLU took pains to describe and justify its legal position in the
court of public opinion. "Our main concern in cases like Nike,"
the ACLU explained, "is to ensure that important First Amend-
53 The Philip Morris-ACLU controversy discussed in this paragraph is documented in Ron
Scherer, ACLU Targeted in Tobacco-Money Flap, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Aug. 4,
1993, at 3 [hereinafter ACLU Targeted]. Morton Mintz updated his charges on the controversy
in a Spring 1998 article. See Morton Mintz, The ACLU and the Tobacco Companies, 52
NEIMAN REPORTS (Spring 1998), http://reclaimdemocracy.org/personhood/aclu_tobacco_
mintz.pdf.
54 See Scherer, supra note 53. Ira Glasser, Executive Director of the ACLU, replied to
Morton Mintz's 1998 article on the controversy, and Mintz wrote a rebuttal. See Letters: To-
bacco and the American Civil Liberties Union, 52 NEIMAN REPORTS (Summer 1998),
http://www.nieman.harvard.edu/reports/98-2NRsum98/NRSum98LETrlERS.html.
55 Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978).
56 See Brief Amici Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of North-
ern California in Support of Petitioner, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003) (No. 02-
575), http://supreme.usatoday.findlaw.com/supreme-Court/briefs/02-575/02-575.mer.ami.aclu.
pdf [hereinafter ACLU Brief]. Although the ACLU filed briefs in support of Nike once review
was granted in the California courts and the U.S. Supreme Court, the organization did not, as is
its general practice, file cert amicus briefs.
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ment protections are not eroded because the speaker or the speech
in question is unpopular or controversial. Thus our brief was not
about the merits of the controversy surrounding the conditions un-
der which Nike's products are manufactured. 57 Rather, the or-
ganization filed an amicus to establish that "on the particular facts
of the case, Nike was entitled to the full protection of the First
Amendment in responding to the criticism leveled at it by others."
Distinguishing Nike's press releases and letters from typical
advertisements, the ACLU's position paper characterized them as
ammunition in a war of words:
Nike was responding in the same places in which it had been
the subject of criticism and in which the debate about its
practices was going on. The intended audience was the gen-
eral public that had read the newspaper articles and columns
and seen the television shows that had criticized Nike-
whether or not these members of the general public were also
potential buyers of Nike's products.
A strong First Amendment culture cannot "accept the logic that
speech that furthers the economic interests of a company is always
commercial speech," lest "businesses will never be able to speak
freely." The cornerstone of a vibrant free speech society is to trust
to "the people ... to separate the wheat from chaff' when assailed
with conflicting information. "While it may not always be a per-
fect system," the ACLU concluded, "it is far better than one in
which the government becomes the arbiter of truth, thereby silenc-
ing one side of the debate."
Marc Kasky and the ReclaimDemocracy.org campaign were
not swayed by the ACLU's rhetoric. Indeed, they were stunned, so
much so that they launched a campaign to urge the ACLU to "stop
promoting corporate 'rights"' of free speech.58 The ACLU's sup-
port, they reasoned, was undermining democracy rather than
strengthening it. The whole idea of the First Amendment, or so
they thought, was to wrestle power away from the powerful rather
than further empowering them to oppress the downtrodden. The
fight was on. The Left was fighting the Left.
57 This and the following quotations describing the ACLU's amicus brief in Kasky are
documented in ACLU of Northern California, The ACLU's Position in Kasky v. Nike, at
http://www.aclunc.org/expression/02053 1-position.html.
58 Milchen, supra note 49.
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E. The Law's Story
[l]t is one thing thus to say that a protest by a businessman
against ... mistreatment of himself in business affairs must
be regarded as constitutionally protected free speech and
quite another to say the same of the businessman's circulars
advertising for business.
-- Judge Jerome Frank
59
In 1942, a little known and long since forgotten Supreme
Court Justice, Owen J. Roberts, wrote a then largely unimportant
opinion for the Supreme Court. The case, Valentine v.
Chrestensen,60 involved the owner of a former United States Navy
submarine who wanted to distribute handbills to invite the public
to view his "$2,000,000 fighting monster" situated alongside a pier
on the East River. New York City's sanitation code, however,
prohibited the distribution of commercial handbills. F.J.
Chrestensen, the vessel's owner, sued the city. The trial court and
federal appellate courts sided with Chrestensen. The Supreme
Court did not-by a 9-0 vote, no less. Buried in Justice Roberts'
otherwise unmemorable 750-word opinion for the Court was a
memorable line:
[T]he Constitution imposes no... restraint[s] on government
as respects purely commercial advertising.6
As a consequence, F.J. Chrestensen lost, since his speech was
no longer deemed to be within the protected ambit of the First
Amendment. The idea that commercial speech was entitled to no
constitutional protection remained good law for over three dec-
ades. Then, thanks largely to Justice Harry Blackmun, commercial
expression began to receive some First Amendment recognition in
the 1970s. It was Blackmun who authored the opinion of the
Court in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council62 that first identified social value in commercial
speech and that inaugurated the modern era of First Amendment
protection for much corporate communication.63 Gradually, the
59 Chrestensen v. Valentine, 122 F.2d 511, 524 (2nd Cir. 1941) (Frank, J., dissenting),
rev'd, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
0 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
61 Id. at 54.
62 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (holding that "commercial speech" is not wholly outside the
protection of the First and Fourteenth Amendments).
63 We need say no more about Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, given the excellent his-
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level of protection increased to the point that, by 2003, a majority
of the Justices was actively revising earlier precedents to safeguard
many new forms of commercial expression.4
Justice Blackmun helped launch the commercial speech revo-
lution as a liberal cause, one consistent with the progressive tradi-
tion of Justice Louis Brandeis. That tradition valued the First
Amendment as a tool of truth, one to be used to shed light on gov-
ernment wrongdoers and on the exploits of the wealthy and power-
ful. More recently, Justice Clarence Thomas embraced that cause
as a libertarian one; 65 the First Amendment was merged with. lais-
sez-faire politics of the kind that maximizes corporate power while
minimizing government regulation. And with that, many liberals
feared, might come the return of a nineteenth-century perspective
on capitalism that was once anathema to every progressive in
America, from Louis Brandeis to Ralph Nader. The times and the
law were changing. Still, the Court remained ambivalent about
equating commercial speech with highly protected political speech.
The libertarian wing of the Court yearned for a case that com-
bined the workings of commercial and political expression. But
where could such a case be found? And who would bring it-all
the way to Washington? Marc Kasky could be just that person and
Kasky v. Nike could be just that case. No wonder, then, that in
1998, U.C. Berkeley law professor Edward Rubin said, "[tihis
(lawsuit) could be a very important event." 66 Indeed. But the road
to the United States Supreme Court is a long and arduous one. For
now, things had to play out at the state court level. Then, in time,
an opportunity might come to take the case to the highest Court in
the land.
torical memoir of that case by the attorney who represented the respondents in the U.S. Supreme
Court, who is a contributor to this Symposium. See Alan B. Morrison, How We Got the Com-
mercial Speech Doctrine: An Originalist's Recollection, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1189 (2004).
64 Once again, thanks to our colleagues in this Symposium, we are relieved from the re-
sponsibility of describing and analyzing the evolution of the commercial speech doctrine from
1976 to present. For astute, albeit contrasting, accounts of that development, see Deborah J. La
Fetra, Kick It Up a Notch: First Amendment Protection for Commercial Speech, 54 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 1205, 1213-16 (2004); Robert M. O'Neil, Nike v. Kasky-What Might Have
Been..., 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1259, 1260-63 (2004); David C. Vladeck, Lessons from a
Story Untold: Nike v. Kasky Reconsidered, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1049, 1050-55 (2004);
James Weinstein, Speech Categorization and the Limits of First Amendment Formalism: Les-
sons from Nike v. Kasky, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1091, 1093-1107 (2004) (discussing more
particularly the First Amendment normative values reflected in doctrinal development of non-
commercial and commercial speech cases).
65 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 518 (1996) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring) (finding a parity between commercial and non-commercial speech for the government's
interest "to keep legal users of a product or service ignorant in order to manipulate their choices
in the marketplace").
66 Binole, supra note 24.
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F. The Superior Court Story
Nike Yells "Foul," Cites First Amendment
-- Footwear News headline, July 6, 199867
"[U]nder Nike's interpretation of the world, they can say
whatever they want. . . . [T]hey can lie because it's a public de-
bate. . . . The First Amendment never contemplated that, ever.,
68
So argued Kasky's impassioned lawyer, Alan Caplan, in the Supe-
rior Court of San Francisco. It was Thursday, January 7, 1999,
and Nike's pre-trial motion to dismiss was being heard.69
The Honorable David A. Garcia presided. Though this was a
novel suit, Judge Garcia was a judge with an open mind. In 1997,
for example, the judge ruled that the San Francisco Cannabis Buy-
ers' Club was a primary caregiver whose practices were protected
under the newly enacted Proposition 2l 5. 70 Translation: Marijuana
could be prescribed for medical purposes. Liberal, open-minded
and creative in approach, just the judge for Marc Kasky's cause.
No doubt, Judge Garcia understood that, if allowed to pro-
ceed, Kasky v. Nike would set an important precedent: it would
allow anybody to invoke false advertising and unfair business
practice laws to contest the honesty of public relations statements
made by American companies about their labor practices at home
or abroad. And the specter of a multi-million-dollar judgment
against Nike, along with a "corrective-commercial campaign,'
might prove, in the end, to be economically disastrous. That pos-
sibility alone gave David J. Brown,72 Nike's hired lawyer and a
partner in a San Francisco law firm with a large international prac-
tice, great pause. Brown had already successfully represented the
likes of Westinghouse Electric in a $100-million case brought
67 Scott Malone, Nike Yells 'Foul,' Cites First Amendment, Says San Francisco Suit Seeks
to 'Handcuff Sneaker Firm from Defending Its Image, FOOTWEAR NEWS, July 6, 1998, at 2,
http://www.its.caltech.edu/-xiuqin/strategy/Nike-foul.htm.
68 Roger Parloff, Can We Talk?, FORTUNE, Sept. 2, 2002, at 102, LEXIS, News & Busi-
ness, News, By Individual Publication, Fortune.
69 Rinat Fried, Suit Against Nike Faces Hurdles, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 11, 1999, at
4, LEXIS, News & Business, News, By Individual Publication, The Legal Intelligencer (reprint-
ing a report on the January 7th hearing of Nike's motion to dismiss); see also Rinat Fried, Judge
Could Throw Out Lawsuit Against Nike, RECORDER, Jan. 8, 1999, at 3, LEXIS, News & Busi-
ness, News, By Individual Publication, The Legal Intelligencer.
70 Judge Garcia's trial court ruling in Cannabis Buyer's Club is discussed in the interme-
diate appellate court's decision in People ex rel. Lungren v. Peron, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 20, 22 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1997) (vacating order and reinstating original injunction).
71 See supra at 11-12.
72 Fried, supra note 69.
2004]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
against the company by the Bay Area Rapid Transit District
(BART). 73 But could he trump Caplan, a feisty plaintiffs'-bar law-
yer who put the fear of God into corporations?
During the January 7th hearing, 74 Judge Garcia was particu-
larly attentive to Nike's claims that the First Amendment protected
it from being drawn into court by the likes of Marc Kasky. "He
was concerned about whether Nike's representations were com-
mercial or non-commercial speech," recounted Caplan.
"In this case," argued Caplan, "there were criticisms of Nike's
labor practices and a call for a boycott. Nike's response was to
misrepresent [its] labor practices and encourage people not to boy-
cott, but to continue to buy their shoes. That's commercial
speech." If so, Nike's speech could be regulated. Still, Judge
Garcia was troubled about how, if at all, that could be done, even
if he ruled Nike's speech to be commercial expression. The situa-
tion did not look promising for the plaintiff, and Brown realized it.
The judge, Brown stated, "essentially said, 'If I buy into the plain-
tiff's theory, when could Nike ever say anything?' because the
plaintiff's theory is that every time Nike speaks, it is promoting its
product."
When judgment day came a few weeks later, on February 5th,
David Brown's hunches proved to be correct. Judge Garcia was
unimpressed with Caplan's novel arguments and the case was dis-
missed with prejudice.75 That was the end of the matter. Kasky v.
Nike would never come before a jury, not as long as the judge's
order stood. Left unchallenged, the order meant that Nike could
stand by its PR statements without fear of being held to legal ac-
count for them. "We're delighted," said Brown. "The bottom line
is we were right,,7 6 he added. While Judge Garcia did not issue a
written opinion, it seemed quite clear that he was taken with
Nike's First Amendment objections to Marc Kasky's suit.
Alan Caplan was frustrated but determined to proceed none-
theless: "[W]e will be appealing," he told reporters. 77 The appel-
late phase of Kasky v. Nike was about to begin.
73 Mr. Brown is now with the law firm of Morgan Lewis in San Francisco. See
http://www.morganlewis.com/index.cfm?nav=05&obj=962871DA-4AC2-4460-A206004DACE
7C841 &showObj=FD3C1B 1E-7A69-4BAD-83AC69DA2BDF7A15&showTab=1&show
Link=2 (last visited May, 3, 2004).
74 The account of the Kasky v. Nike hearing before Judge Garcia, as well as the quotations
in this paragraph and the next, are documented in Fried, supra note 69.
75 Kasky v. Nike, No. 994446 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 5, 1999) (dismissing complaint).
76 Rinat Fried, Judge Throws Out Nike Advertising Fraud Case, RECORDER, Feb. 8, 1999,
at 3, LEXIS, News & Business, News, News Group File, All.
77 Id.
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G. The California Appellate Court Story
The vast majority of appeals lose. Failure is even more cer-
tain when the First Amendment stands in the way of victory. Still,
Kasky and Caplan could take comfort in the fact that California
State Attorney General Bill Lockyer, the Sierra Club, and the Cali-
fornia Labor Federation/AFL-CIO, among others, all filed briefs in
the California Court of Appeal in support of their claims.
Early in 2000, Paul R. Hoeber78 left his office on Pine Street
and headed toward 350 McAllister Street. There, on the fourth
floor, he would argue Kasky v. Nike before a three-judge panel in
Division One of the First Appellate District of the California Court
of Appeal. Though the fifty-seven-year-old lawyer lacked much
appellate experience, he more than made up for it in general legal
experience.
At the time, Hoeber was with the San Francisco law firm of
Bushnell, Caplan and Fielding, where he specialized in represent-
ing plaintiffs under the federal False Claims Act and the state Un-
fair Competition Law. During the heyday of the San Francisco
counter-culture, he was an undergraduate at Berkeley; he then took
his law degree from Boalt Hall at U.C. Berkeley. He went on, as
do the brightest, to clerk in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit and then at the U.S. Supreme Court. Hoeber's subsequent
career spanned everything from teaching law at Boalt, to working
as a lawyer in the Civil Rights and Criminal Divisions of the Jus-
tice Department, to serving as a staff attorney for the United Mine
Workers. At one point in 1973-74, he was one of the prosecutors
on the Watergate Special Prosecution Force. With such creden-
tials, Hoeber could readily prepare for argument before one of
California's intermediate appellate courts.
Justices Douglas E. Swager and James J. Marchiano heard the
case, along with the Acting Presiding Justice, William D. Stein.79
When it was decided, the three jurists found themselves in com-
plete agreement. On March 20, 2000, the court issued its ruling:
trial court judgment affirmed, court costs awarded to Nike. There
was "no reasonable possibility," Justice Swager wrote for the
court, that Kasky could win this case: "We see no merit to appel-
lant's scattershot argument that he might still be able to state a
78 The account on Paul Hoeber in this paragraph and the next is derived from Law Offices
of Bushnell, Caplan & Fielding, at http://www.bcflaw.com/hoeber.htm (last visited May 3,
2004), and http://www.bcflaw.comdirections.htm (last visited May 3, 2004).
79 The description of the state appellate court ruling in this paragraph and the next is docu-
mented in Kasky v. Nike, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 854 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
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cause of action on some theory allowing content-related abridge-
ment of noncommercial speech."
Because "Nike exemplifies the perceived evils or benefits of
labor practices associated with the processes of economic global-
ization," Swager reasoned, the company's statements could not be
confined to the definition of more narrowly protected commercial
speech. "Nike's strong corporate image and widespread consumer
market place its labor practices in the context of a broader debate
about the social implications of employing low-cost foreign labor
for manufacturing functions once performed by domestic work-
ers," Swager continued. Nike had provided "data relevant to a
controversy of great public interest in our times." Thus, what Nike
had done by responding to its critics, Swager concluded, was to
engage in "a public dialogue on a matter of public concern within
the core area of expression protected by the First Amendment."
Alan Caplan was incensed: "Nike would like to blow up their
statements into a highfalutin' public debate on globalization when
really it's much simpler than that-it's specific statements about
how their specific products are made . . . .Even though they're
lying, they could say they're taking part in a public debate."8°
Now it was on to the California Supreme Court with two losses to
overcome. But there review was discretionary, which is never an
encouraging prospect.
Somewhat surprisingly, on June 21, 2000, the California Su-
preme Court agreed to hear the case. Five justices had voted to
take up Kasky v. Nike, Inc.: Chief Justice Ronald M. George and
Justices Stanley Mosk, Joyce Kennard, Kathryn Mickle Werdeger
and Janice Rogers Brown. 8' Kasky and company were back in the
running. Why else would the state high court hear the matter, if
not to consider seriously the possibility of reversing the lower ap-
pellate court? But in Niketown, the sentiment was far more appre-
hensive. As Nike spokesman Vada Manager put it: "We certainly
hope the [California] Supreme Court will affirm the earlier court
ruling that this case didn't have legal merit and didn't have a place
in the legal system. 82
80 Josh Richman, Greenwashing on Trial, Feb. 23, 2001, at http://www.mothejones.comI
news/feature/2001/02/greenwash.html.
81 Kevin Livingston, Justices Lace Up for Nike Case, RECORDER, June 22, 2000, at 7,
LEXIS, News & Business, News, News, All.
82 Associated Press, State High Court to Decide If Nike Violated False-Advertising Laws,
June 22, 2000 (on file with authors).
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H. The California Supreme Court Story
Nike Can't Just Say It, Court Rules
-- Los Angeles Times headline, May 3, 200283
Paul Hoeber appeared to be on the ropes.84 Standing before
the California Supreme Court on February 6, 2002, the day of oral
arguments in Kasky v. Nike, the appellant's lawyer defiantly as-
saulted the lower court's judgment, but received blow after blow
from the most skeptical of the jurists. Justice Brown led the attack
on Hoeber's argument that Nike's communications were false
commercial statements that receive no constitutional protection.
Brown, the morally conservative and economically libertarian Af-
rican-American, 85 seemed incredulous that Nike statements could
be any less protected in this context than if the company had ut-
tered them in testimony before the California legislature regarding
a bill to regulate sweatshops. "Aren't they allowed to say that?
Isn't it protected?," she questioned. "You are reading something
into [the company's statements] to make it commercial." When
Hoeber held his ground, arguing that the context may be all-
determinative, Justice Marvin R. Baxter delivered the next punch.
Defining Nike's communications as constitutionally unprotected
speech, Baxter observed, would result in "a debate with one par-
ticipant with his hands tied behind his back."
Not all of the justices seemed entirely unsympathetic to Hoe-
ber's contentions, however. Justice Kennard took up a lance for
the Kasky cause, asking: "Why can't the state regulate such false
and misleading statements?" Again and again, Kennard zeroed in
on Kasky's charge of false advertising: "I don't think we can sim-
ply disregard that. That, I think, is the crux of the case here."
When the verbal contest ended, however, it seemed, at least to the
press, that the California high court was leaning toward Nike's
83 Maura Dolan, Nike Can't Just Say It, Court Rules, L.A. TIMES, May 3, 2002, at A].
84 The account of the California Supreme Court oral arguments related in this paragraph
and the next is largely derived from Mike McKee, Nike Ads Not Actionable, Justices Hint, LE-
GAL INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 8, 2002, at 2, LEXIS, News & Business, News, News, All [hereinaf-
ter Nike Ads Not Actionable].
85 For a profile report on Justice Brown, see Mike McKee, Brown Raises Eyebrows,
Doesn't Mince Words, REcORDER, Feb. 11, 2003, at 4, LEXIS, News & Business, News, News
Group File, All. Justice Brown was subsequently nominated by President Bush for an appoint-
ment to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Speculation
has raged over a possible Bush nomination to the U.S. Supreme Court in the event of an open-
ing. See Daniel Klaidman et al., Supreme Court: Moving on, Moving in, Moving up: A Vacancy
Could Open up in the U.S. Supreme Court Soon, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 17, 2003, at 9, LEXIS, News
& Business, News, By Individual Publication, N, Newsweek.
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side. The next day, the headline of The Legal Intelligencer's arti-
cle on the case read: "Nike's Ads Not Actionable, Justices Hint."
That hint, however strong, ultimately proved deceptive.
When the California Supreme Court issued its judgment on May 2,
2002, Nike had lost.86 By a slim margin, the Court voted 4-3 that
Nike could be found liable for its allegedly deceptive public state-
ments regarding its labor practices. In other words, those commu-
nications were commercial speech for which the company could be
held civilly liable under California's consumer protection statutes.
Justice Kennard, Kasky's champion during oral arguments,
wrote the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice George and
Associate Justices Werdeger and Carlos A. Moreno. Recognizing
that the U.S. Supreme Court had not succeeded in formulating an
"all-purpose test" 87 to distinguish commercial from non-
commercial speech, the majority strove for much less. It provided
merely a "limited-purpose test," 88 one suited only for cases in
which "a court must decide whether particular speech may be sub-
jected to laws aimed at preventing false advertising or other forms
of commercial deception., 89  Under that test, the Court held,
Nike's communications must be considered commercial expression
subject to California's consumer protection regulations.
The "limited-purpose test" required consideration of three
elements: the identity of the speaker, the identity of the intended
audience, and the content of the message. 9° In a typical commer-
cial speech case, the speaker would be someone engaging in com-
merce, "that is, generally, the production, distribution, or sale of
goods or services." 9' The audience normally would be the "actual
or potential buyers or customers ... or persons (such as reporters
or reviewers) likely to repeat the message" to those targets. 92 Fi-
nally, the message's factual content "should be commercial in
character., 93 Usually, this would include "representations of fact
about the business operations, products, or services of the
speaker... made for the purpose of promoting sales of, or other
commercial transactions in, the speaker's products or services." 94
Given that standard, it clearly followed that Nike could never
prevail. After all, Nike was a manufacturer of a product, Nike's
86 Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002).







94 Id. at 256.
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audience included many past and potential buyers or customers,
and Nike was making factual representations about its own busi-
ness practices. "The wages paid to the factories' employees, the
hours they work, the way they are treated, and whether the envi-
ronmental conditions under which they work violate local health
and safety laws," Justice Kennard reasoned, were all topics on
which "Nike was in a position to readily verify the truth of any
factual assertions it made." 95
Remarkably, the California high court considered it irrelevant
whether Nike's declarations had been infused into a current and
significant public debate on multinational corporate sweatshops in
Southeast Asia. "For purposes of categorizing Nike's speech as
commercial or noncommercial," Kennard wrote, "it does not mat-
ter that Nike was responding to charges publicly raised by others
and was thereby participating in a public debate." 96 As if she were
adjudging the obscenity of films that opened with the obligatory
statements by psychologists or doctors attesting to the social value
of sex education, Kennard argued that Nike could not "immunize"
any deceptive data about its products from governmental regula-
tion "simply by including references to public issues." 97 Should
the risk of exposure to legal liability "make Nike more cautious,
and cause it to make greater efforts to verify the truth of its state-
,,98ments, that would be so much the better. Then, the California
consumer protection laws would only be serving their purposes,
the Court concluded, by "insuring that the stream of commercial
information flow[s] cleanly as well as freely." 99
The dissenting opinions, written by Justices Ming W. Chin
(joined by Baxter) and Brown, were incredulous over the ill-
considered and unconstitutional handicap that the majority had
placed on Nike when engaging in a public controversy over its
production practices. "While Nike's critics have taken full advan-
tage of their right to 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' debate,"
Chin wrote, "the same cannot be said of Nike, the object of their
ire. When Nike tries to defend itself from these attacks, the major-
ity denies it the same First Amendment protection Nike's critics
enjoy." 1°° The Court had refused, Chin argued, "to honor a fun-
damental commitment and guarantee that both sides in a public
95 Id. at 258.
96 Id. at 260.
97 Id. (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983)).
98 Id. at 258.
99 Id. (quoting Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 772
(1976)).
1°Id. at 263 (Chin, J., dissenting) (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964)).
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debate may compete vigorously-and equally-in the marketplace
of ideas."' 0 '
Similarly, Justice Brown's dissent railed again the majority's
three-part test and its application to Nike for violating fundamental
principles of First Amendment jurisprudence. Not only did the
test, in her mind, fail to clarify the commercial speech doctrine,
but it also "favors some speakers over others" in today's culture of
commerce and communication. 10 2 "With the growth of commer-
cialism, the politicization of commercial interests, and the increas-
ing sophistication of commercial advertising over the past cen-
tury," Brown observed, "the gap between commercial and non-
commercial speech is rapidly shrinking."'1 3  Only by applying
heightened scrutiny, for fully protected communication, to "inex-
tricably intertwined" commercial and non-commercial expression




Instead, the majority unfortunately had opted for "singling out
speakers engaged in commerce and restricting their ability to par-
ticipate in the public debate."' 0 5 As such, the Court's decision had
violated the first principles of the American free-speech system.
"The First Amendment does not permit favoritism toward a certain
speaker," Brown concluded, "'based on the identity of the interests
that [the speaker] may represent."",
10 6
The reactions were vociferous, as free-speech advocates ago-
nized and anti-corporate activists applauded. On the one hand,
Ann Brick, the ACLU-Northern California attorney who had sub-
mitted an amicus brief to the California Supreme Court, protested
that now the First Amendment was "the loser." "[The ruling's]
impact could be very broad," Brick warned.'0 7 "If you are a busi-
ness speaker, your ability to speak out on a public issue that di-
rectly affects your company is dramatically affected."' 1 8 On the
other hand, Marc Kasky was jubilant. "I feel very happy about the
court's ruling," he said. "It means a company can't misrepresent
itself and gain from it."'' 9 Naturally, Nike's general counsel, Jim
Carter, found Kasky's view on the ramifications of the California
101 Id. at 267 (Chin, J., dissenting).
102 ld. at 268 (Brown, J., dissenting).
103 Id. at 269 (Brown, J., dissenting).
104 Id. (Brown, J., dissenting).
105 Id. at 273 (Brown, J., dissenting).




7 Dolan, supra note 83.
108 Id.
109 Rubenstein, supra note 19.
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high court's rulings to be short-sighted. Carter expressed his con-
cerns in an interview with a reporter from Corporate Counsel:
Corporate Counsel: Why have media organizations been so
concerned about this case?
Jim Carter: A company wouldn't be protected by the fact
that statements were made public through third parties, even
reporters. So if I'm a reporter, one concern would be that I
can't get free or easy access to companies to talk to me about
issues that are in this realm-globalization, corporate respon-
sibility, whatever-because those companies would recog-
nize that their statements, even [if made] on an informational
background basis ... could put them at risk.
Corporate Counsel: If the [U.S. Supreme] Court [were to
decide] that Nike has engaged in commercial speech that can
be restricted, could the company present its positions any
other way?
Jim Carter: I don't think we can. That's really the heart of
the issue here. We have a public profile. We are the case
about globalization in many people's minds, so if we're not
given this opportunity . . . to talk [about the topic], I don't
know that we have another option.... It's hard to talk about
globalization and factories in Asia without talking about our-
selves as part of the process. And that's what we're asking
for. 
110
While Marc Kasky and his lawyers were busy celebrating their
unexpected California Supreme Court victory, New York Times
columnist Bob Herbert was busy finishing his ninth column on
Nike and its "sweatshop" practices. On May 6, 2002, he wrote:
"Nike has wrung billions and billions of dollars from the toil and
the sweat and in some cases the physical abuse of impoverished
workers-mostly women-in places like China and Vietnam and
Indonesia." ''
It was another shot at the wounded Goliath, another "cheap
shot" in Nike's view. By the same token, Herbert's column was
equally objectionable to Kasky and company, as Herbert conceded:
"As much as it pains me to say it, I am not in favor of stifling the
10The Risks of Just Doing It, CORP. COUNSEL, Mar. 2003, at 20, LEXIS, News & Busi-
ness, News, News Group File, All (alterations in original).
I Let Nike Stay in the Game, supra note 11.
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speech of the loud and obnoxious and terminally exploitative Nike
Corporation." Amazing. One of Nike's staunchest critics had be-
come one of its defenders, but only so far as the First Amendment
was concerned.
The case was now headed for the U.S. Supreme Court with, of
all people, Bob Herbert's blessing.
II. THE LANDMARK THAT ENDED IN A SETTLEMENT
A. A Brief History
[L]eeway for untruthful or misleading expression that has
been allowed in other contexts has little force in the
commercial arena.
-- Justice Harry Blackmun
112
A case is only as good as its lawyers. And when you're Nike,
you can buy the best. The well-heeled shoe manufacturer did just
that. To go to the Supreme Court, Nike tapped a dynamic team:
Professor Laurence Tribe of Harvard Law School, Walter
Dellinger of O'Melveny & Myers and formerly a professor at
Duke Law School, and Thomas Goldstein of Goldstein & Howe.
1 13
The sage constitutionalist, the seasoned scholar turned skillful
lawyer, and the boy wonder of Supreme Court litigation were the
trio that Nike hoped would change its fortune.
The lawyerly challenge in Nike was how to garner First
Amendment protection for admittedly misleading speech, commu-
nicated by a commercial entity, concerning matters related to its
product. "Until Nike," Professor David Vladeck notes in his con-
tribution to this Symposium, "it was accepted as orthodoxy that
false statements made in the course of a commercial transaction by
a seller of a product or service were not entitled to constitutional
protection."'" 4 So the trio of Tribe, Dellinger and Goldstein had to
craft an argument in defense of false expression alleged to be com-
mercial. How would they do it? How would they get around the
maxim that there is "no constitutional value in false statements of
fact"? 15 What could they possibly say to counter what Justice
112 Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977).
113 Nike had hired and/or consulted numerous other scholars and lawyers. The other at-
torneys formally listed on Nike's Supreme Court briefs were David J. Brown and James N.
Penrod of Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison.
114 Vladeck, supra note 64, at 1061.
115 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
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Blackmun, the godfather of commercial speech, had written in Vir-
ginia Pharmacy: that the "elimination of false and deceptive
claims" contributes to the "flow of accurate and reliable informa-
tion relevant to public and private decisionmaking"? 
6
As it wound its way through the legal system, Nike v. Kasky
was a popular moot court problem in law schools, precisely be-
cause it tested the law's purpose, logic, relevance, and future di-
rection. It tumbled questions of legal precedent with social policy,
questions of consumer protection with corporate expression, and
questions of how to apply the niceties of established doctrine to
the realities of the modem marketplace. It was, in other words,
exactly the kind of cerebral challenge that the trio of Nike's law-
yers welcomed.
Two years before Nike arrived at the Supreme Court, the Jus-
tices rendered an opinion in United States v. United Foods, Inc.1
7
Therein, the majority stressed that commercial speech is speech
"that does no more than propose a commercial transaction."
11 8
This echoed what the Court had said two decades earlier in Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission:
commercial speech is "expression related solely to the economic
interests of the speaker and its audience."" 9 This language was
pregnant with possibility.
The answer to the riddle confronting Nike lay in the italicized
language. The Beaverton company's statements, the trio would
argue, did more than propose a commercial transaction; they ad-
dressed matters of social concern. If that were so, then the contro-
versy before the Justices need not be tagged as one involving sim-
ply commercial speech. Once released from that categorical con-
fine, Nike's lawyers were free to turn to a more speech-protective
standard, one akin to political expression and its accompanying
constitutional safeguards. And, once they got to those constitu-
tional shores, certain falsehoods could be protected. Voila! But
first, they had to take several steps in their argument to get to that
destination.
Step 1: Unless protected, corporate speech about public mat-
ters could readily be regulated: "It is literally impossible for a
company to engage in public communication about itself on mat-
ters of social importance with any confidence that the population
16 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 781
(1976) (emphasis added).
117 533 U.S. 405 (2001). Notably, Professor Tribe argued the cause for United Foods in
the Supreme Court hearing on this case.
118 Id. at 409 (emphasis added).
119447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980) (emphasis added).
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of California will be satisfied that the company's disclosures are
entirely truthful and complete."'' 20  Absent substantial constitu-
tional protection, virtually all corporate speech could be deemed
commercial and therefore subject to Kasky-like actions.12
Step 2: Commercial expression must be defined narrowly.
Speech like that employed by Nike is not commercial unless it
"addresses the qualities of a product as such (like its price, avail-
ability, or suitability)" and appears in an "advertisement" or a
"product label."'' 22
Step 3: Seen in context, Nike's speech was more than com-
mercial; it was speech about a public matter. "This Court has 'fre-
quently reaffirmed that speech on public issues occupies the high-
est rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values, and is enti-
tled to special protection.
' ''123
Step 4: Such "special protection" includes protection for cer-
tain false or misleading statements. False statements of the kind
made by Nike could be regulated provided there were certain con-
stitutional safeguards-specifically, the "actual malice" standard
of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. In other words, if Nike were
reckless in making false assertions or if it knowingly misstated the
truth about such facts, then the trio would concede the possibility
of liability. 124
Step 5: The New York Times standard of First Amendment
protection must apply equally to corporate speakers. Any less pro-
tective standard would preclude corporations from ever engaging
in political expression. Any other approach would cut "the heart
out of the First Amendment's protections for statements by com-
mercial entities on nearly every public issue-from a company's
diversity policy to its community relations efforts to its political
activities-all of which can be said to 'matter in making consumer
choices.' '1 25 Moreover, there was ample reason for applying the
New York Times test to Nike's speech, the trio argued. While Nike
could readily be held liable for its misstatements of fact, Kasky
20 Petitioner's Brief at 42, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003) (No. 02-575),
available at http://supreme.usatoday.findlaw.com/supreme_court/briefs/02-575/02-575.mer.
pet.pdf.
121 The Respondent seemed to concede this point: "It is true that almost anything a com-
pany does or says may have an economic motivation, whether the company is building a new
plant or supporting favorable legislation, and thus may ultimately serve the purpose of 'promot-
ing sales of its products."' Respondent's Brief at 34, Nike (No. 02-575), available at
http://supreme.usatoday.findlaw.comlsupremecourt/briefs/02-575/02-575.mer. resp.pdf.
122 Petitioner's Brief at 21, Nike (No. 02-575); see also id. at 6, 24, 27, 30, 34 & nn. 9, 35,
36.
123 Id. at 26 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983)).
1
24 d. at 43-44.
125 Id. at 27 (citation omitted).
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and his anti-corporate cohorts could only be held liable under the
more demanding New York Times formula. 1
26
The trio was arguing for a context-based approach to deciding
First-Amendment questions. Thus, in their judgment, the mere
identity of the speaker was inadequate. And the mere abstract la-
beling of Nike's expression as "commercial" was likewise insuffi-
cient. Also important, though discussed late in their brief, was the
absence of any harm to consumers:
There is no suggestion that consumers received Nike prod-
ucts of lesser quality or at a higher price than they bargained
for, much less that they bought Nike products that were in
any respect defective or dangerous; indeed, none of the
statements on the basis of which the court below has held pe-
titioner liable to suit even addressed such matters.
127
Paul Hoeber, aided by Alan Caplan and others, rose to the chal-
lenge cast by the forceful trio. They devoted almost half of their
merits brief to contesting Nike's right to bring this case before the
Justices. Even after the Court had agreed to review the case, Hoe-
ber argued that "[t]he Court has no jurisdiction in this case."'
128
Though many thought that issue now settled, the Respondent
pressed it vigorously nonetheless, a move that would prove pro-
phetic.
On the free-speech front, the Respondent's brief moved along
five discernible steps of analysis:
Step 1: The California regulatory scheme contained safe-
guards to discourage unfounded actions against commercial speak-
ers:
California law embodies important safeguards and protec-
tions for defendants in these private-plaintiff actions. First
and foremost, private plaintiffs who have not suffered an in-
jury have no financial incentive for bringing suit.... [T]he
unfair-competition and false advertising laws do not permit
the recovery of damages. Thus, successful plaintiffs receive
no recovery for themselves, and they receive no "bounty"
from any other recovery, as they do, for example, under the
federal False Claims Act.
129
Building on that line of logic, Hoeber argued:
1
26 See id. at 27-28, 35.
1
27 Id. at 35.
12 Respondent's Brief at 14, Nike (No. 02-575).
129 ld. at 20 (citation omitted).
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Moreover, in cases brought by private plaintiffs under these
laws, the defendant's financial exposure is limited. Not only
can there be no recovery of damages, there can be no dis-
gorgement of profits and no use of the class-action remedy of
disgorgement into a fluid recovery fund. Thus, in these
cases, the only available monetary remedy is restitution,
which is limited to "[aictual direct victims of unfair competi-
tion." This means that, when a trial court awards restitution,
it must use a claims procedure that requires "notify[ing] the
absent persons on whose behalf the action is prosecuted of
their right to make a claim for restitution." Hence, in a case
like this one, restitution is limited to those identified claim-
ants who relied on the defendant's false representations in
buyinq its product and who make individual claims for re-
funds. 0
Step 2: Nike's speech was commercial and could be regulated
accordingly. In developing this argument, it is significant that the
Respondent drew from the brief filed by the United States in sup-
port of Nike:
Representations concerning a company's production prac-
tices give consumers information to rely on in making in-
formed purchasing decisions, as the United States points out:
"In today's environment, the means used to produce goods,
no less than the quality of the goods themselves, have pro-
found significance for some consumers, who are willing to
pay more to achieve desirable environmental or social
ends."
131
Step 3: The Federal Trade Commission has long regulated, as
commercial speech, corporate statements concerning things other
than the price and character of consumer goods or services. It has,
for example, "regulated claims that a product is of U.S. origin un-
der § 5 of the FTC Act" and has likewise "determined that false
representations that goods are made by members of a labor union
violate § 5.' 132 Similarly, the government has often regulated cor-
porate statements concerning the working practices related to pro-
1
30 Id. at 21. Among other safeguards, the Respondent's brief noted: "The defendant also
has the right to file a 'SLAPP' motion under California's anti-Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation statute. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 425.16 (App. 49a)." Id. at 23.
131 Id. at 29 (emphasis added) (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae United States at 28, Nike
(No. 02-575), available at http://supreme.usatoday.findlaw.comlsupremecourt/briefs/02-575/
02-575.mer. ami.usa.pdf).
132 Id at 30-31.
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duction, just as it has regulated corporate statements related to the
environmental consequences of production.' 33
Step 4: Nike's statements were sufficiently specific and prod-
uct-related to warrant the conclusion that they were intended to
have a commercial effect:
Nike sought to maintain its sales and profits by appealing to
consumers, such as directors of athletics, who would believe
its representations about the conditions in its production fa-
cilities and therefore buy its goods. In making these repre-
sentations, then, Nike's purpose was "to affect purchasing
decisions by the receivers of the information."'
134
Step 5: There was no disparity of treatment here between
commercial and non-commercial speakers. The law had not been
used exclusively to single out corporations, as evidenced by the
fact that public interest groups had been sued by corporations for
false statements: "[D]amages suits can be and are brought against
noncommercial speakers, including 'media' defendants, for false
statements about a company's products, even where the noncom-
mercial speech concerns issues of public health and safety."'
135
Obviously, there was more, including a reply brief for the Pe-
titioners.1 36 But if the main analytical and doctrinal cards had not
yet been played, they would be soon by a bevy of briefs filed by a
variety of interested third parties.
B. Friends of the Court
Write an opinion, and read it afew years later when it is dis-
sected in the briefs of counsel. You will learn for the first
time the limitations of the power of speech.
-- Benjamin N. Cardozo
137
Had Justice Cardozo participated in the Nike case, he might
have marveled at how differently the First Amendment issue was
presented and how dissimilarly the law was characterized. That
diversity of perspectives was particularly apparent in the 31
133Id. at 31-34.
3 Id. at 34 (citation omitted).
135 Id. at 48.
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20041
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
amicus curiae, or "friend of the court," briefs filed with the United
States Supreme Court.1 38
For Martin Garbus, a First Amendment lawyer, 39 the issue
was a vintage free-speech one: "This case raises the question of
whether a corporation can be subject to litigation and possible li-
ability ...for engaging in public discourse.., where its speech
makes no mention of the quality or price of its products."'14 By
contrast, for Patrick Gallagher, lead counsel for the Sierra Club,
the issue had nothing to do with censorship and everything to do
with a falsehood perpetrated on the public. Hence, he couched the
issue this way:
Whether a state government can regulate a corporation's
false statements about its labor practices, that were made in
order to improve its public image and induce consumers to
purchase its products, because commercial speech restrictions
are permissible under the First Amendment to ensure the
public receives truthful information about corporate products
and services?141
As to the law, ACLU counsel Mark J. Lopez echoed what
Garbus had said: "The decision below improperly extends the
commercial speech doctrine to justify the suppression of speech in
violation of core First Amendment principles.' 42 To the contrary,
Bill Lockyer, California's Attorney General, saw the controlling
precedents in the commercial speech line of cases bearing upon
fraud and falsehoods. Although the First Amendment protects
commercial speech from unwarranted government regulation, ac-
cording to Lockyer, "the Court has never wavered in holding that
'[t]he States and the Federal Government are free to prevent the
dissemination of commercial speech that is false, deceptive, or
misleading.
' , 143
Other lawyers, such as former Solicitor General Kenneth W.
Starr, representing the Chamber of Commerce, considered the
Court's commercial speech precedents in sore need of clarifica-
138 See Nike, 123 S. Ct. at 2650 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
139 Although Martin Garbus worked on the amicus brief for his firm, Davis & Gilbert,
LLP, he ultimately chose not to sign the brief. See discussion infra at 998-99.
140 Brief of Amici Curiae Association of National Advertising, Inc. et al. at 2, Nike (No.
02-575), available at http://supreme.usatoday.findlaw.com/supreme-court/ briefs/02-575/02-
575.mer.ami.ana.pdf.
141 Brief of Amici Curiae Sierra Club et al. at 1, Nike (No. 02-575), available at
http:llsupreme.usatoday.findlaw.comlsupremecourtlbriefs/02-57502-575.mer. ami.sierra.pdf.
142 Brief of Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Northern Cali-
formia in Support of Petitioner at 6, Nike (No. 02-575).
143 Brief of Amici Curiae States of California et al. at 9, Nike (No. 02-575), available at
http://supreme.usatoday.findlaw.com/supreme-court/briefs/02-575/02-575.mer.ami.states.pdf.
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tion, albeit in Nike's favor: "For many years, the Court has sent
conflicting signals on the definition of 'commercial speech' and
has allowed the lower courts to take divergent approaches on this
issue."' 44
Indeed, for Deborah J. La Fetra, counsel for the Pacific Legal
Foundation and one of the contributors to this Symposium, the
state of the commercial speech doctrine was dizzying. Her argu-
ment is best set out by way of extended quotation:
Over the past 60 years, this Court's approach to speech ut-
tered by business interests has ranged from zero protection
(Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942)), to very high
protection (Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citi-
zens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976)), to a
four-part test (Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980)), which has itself
undergone revision (Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of
New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (upholding a
regulation outlawing Tupperware parties on a university
campus); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484,
504 (1996) (when a regulation constitutes a blanket prohibi-
tion against truthful, nonmisleading speech about a lawful
product and the ban serves an interest unrelated to consumer
protection, it will be subject to a heightened form of First
Amendment scrutiny akin to strict scrutiny.)). There have
been conflicting analyses depending on the speaker (Bates v.
State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977), and Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Association, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (lesser pro-
tection accorded to attorney solicitations)) and the social
worth of the activity promoted (Compare Posadas de Puerto
Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 342, 348 (1986)
(restrictions on advertisements for legal gambling facilities
do not violate the first amendment) with Village of Schaum-
burg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 632
(1980) (restrictions on solicitations for charity struck
down)).145
In the toss and turn of First Amendment arguments, going this
way or that, somehow and somewhere there was likely to be a di-
rection that the Supreme Court would favor. Whatever that direc-
144 Brief of Amici Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America at 2,
Nike (No. 02-575), available at http://supreme.usatoday.findlaw.com supreme_court/briefs/02-
575/02-575.mer.ami.ccus.pdf.
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tion might be, the amici generally shared the hope that it would be
a clear and decisive one, offering a guided path through the bram-
bles of the commercial speech doctrine.
Martin Garbus is a maverick who loves to defend mavericks.
In his four-plus decades of private practice, he has been the
mouthpiece for writer Samuel Beckett, comedian Lenny Bruce,
146
actor Robert Redford, union organizer Cesar Chavez, director
Spike Lee, Russian dissident Andrei Sakharov, Czech playwright
Vaclav Havel, experimental-drug guru Timothy Leary, and Henri-
etta Wright, an African American who was beaten by Mississippi
police in 1965 when she attempted to vote. 147 He is the underdog's
lawyer, though his firm is upscale and his office is uptown in Man-
hattan. Marc Kasky, a rabble-rouser critical of exploitative power
brokers, was Garbus' kind of guy, the kind of client he could hap-
pily represent pro bono.
It almost came to that as Garbus consulted with friends and
colleagues regarding the side on which to file an amicus brief
in Nike v. Kasky. It was a tough call. In the end, the vote went
against Kasky and with the First Amendment. Garbus' firm filed
on behalf of advertising associations in support of Nike. Incredi-
bly, Martin Garbus elected not to sign onto the amicus brief filed
by his firm. For whatever reason, he decided that Nike v. Kasky
was not the case in which he wanted to be a "friend of the Court."
Where others came forward, Garbus stood back.
But the lineup of amicus lawyers was nonetheless quite spec-
tacular. On Kasky's side 148 the names included:
" Alan B. Morrison, Public Citizen Litigation Group
149
" David Vladeck, Public Citizen Litigation Group' s
146See generally RONALD COLLINS & DAVID SKOVER, THE TRIALS OF LENNY BRUCE
(2002).
1
47 See MARTIN GARBUS & STANLEY COHEN, TOUGH TALK 10 (1998) (discussing Andrei
Sakharov); id. at 65-68 (discussing Cesar Chavez); id. at 186-88 (discussing Samuel Beckett);
id. at 199-207 (discussing Spike Lee); id. at 221-23 (discussing Robert Redford); id. at 270-76
(discussing Vaclav Havel); see also MARTIN GARBUS, READY FOR THE DEFENSE 3-77 (1971)
(discussing Henrietta Wright); id. at 81-140 (discussing Lenny Bruce); id at 259-306 (discuss-
ing Timothy Leary).
148 Significantly, the AFIJCIO, which had supported Kasky with an amicus brief in the
California Supreme Court, now urged the U.S. Supreme Court to sustain Nike's First Amend-
ment claims. Brief of Amici Curiae American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations, Nike (No. 02-575), available at http://supreme.usatoday.findlaw.coml
supremescourt/briefs/2-575/2-575.mer.ami.aflcio.pdf.
149 Brief of Amici Curiae Public Citizen, Nike (No. 02-575), available at http://supreme.
usatoday.findlaw.com/supremecourt/briefs/02-575/02-575.mer.ami.pubcit.pdf. Mr. Morrison
is a contributor to this Symposium.
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* Professor Erwin Chemerinsky, University of South-
ern California School of Law 
5 1
* Professor Catherine Fisk, Loyola University, Los
Angeles, School of Law'
52
* Professor Thomas McGarity, University of Texas
School of Law
153
* Professor Tamara R. Piety, University of Tulsa Col-
lege of Law
154
On Nike's side, the names included:
* Kenneth Starr, Kirkland & Ellis
155
* Bruce Johnson, Davis Wright Tremaine
156
* David H. Remes, Covington & Burling
57
* Professor Robert M. O'Neil, The Thomas Jefferson
Center for the Protection of Free Expression
1 58
* Professor Martin Redish, Northwestern University
School of Law
159
There are friends of the Court, and there are friends of the
Court. But there is no better friend than the Solicitor General of
the United States, a friend who always has the ears of the Justices.
It was, Nike must have thought, a good omen: The United States
filed a brief in support of the company. Incredible! The lawyers
for the federal regulatory system, including the Federal Trade
Commission, were siding with a corporate entity that called on the
Court to diminish regulatory powers. And that such a brief would
150Id. Mr. Vladeck is also a contributor to this Symposium.
151 Brief of Amici Curiae Members of the United States Congress, Representative Dennis
J. Kucinich et al., Nike (No. 02-575), available at http://supreme.usatoday.findlaw.com/
supreme court/briefs/02-575/02-75.mer.ami.congress.pdf. Professor Chemerinsky has co-
authored an article for this Symposium.
1
5 2
1d. Professor Fisk is Professor Chemerinksy's co-author in the article for this Sympo-
sium.
153 Brief of Amici Curiae Sierra Club et al., Nike (No. 02-575).
15 Id.
155 Brief of Amici Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, Nike
(No. 02-575).
156Brief of Amici Curiae Thirty-Two Leading Newspapers et al., Nike (No. 02-575),
available at http://supreme.usatoday.findlaw.comlsupremecourt/briefs/02-575/02-575.pet.ami.
media.pdf. Mr. Johnson contributed to this Symposium.
'57Brief of Amici Curiae EXXONMobile et al., Nike (No. 02-575), available at
http://supreme.usatoday.findlaw.com/supremecourt/briefs/02-575/02-575.mer.ami.exxon.pdf.
158 Brief of Amici Curiae Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression
and the Media Institute, Nike (No. 02-575), available at http://supreme.usatoday.
findlaw.com/supremecourt/briefs/02-575/02-575.mer.ami.tjc.pdf. Professor O'Neil contrib-
uted to this Symposium.
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be filed over the signature of Solicitor General Theodore Olson, a
highly able and respected lawyer, was better still.
But the omen proved to be a mixed blessing, if only given the
concessions that were made in the government's brief. As noted
above, Olson argued that "[riepresentations concerning Nike's
means of production" were not beyond the pale of regulation, the
First Amendment notwithstanding.160
Moreover, the government's brief hedged its bets and urged a
rather narrow ground for reversing the ruling of the California Su-
preme Court:
The First Amendment permits reasonable regulation of
speech that is false, deceptive, or misleading, through the
mechanisms of private causes of action and direct govern-
ment regulation. A traditional common-law private suit for
misrepresentation presents no First Amendment difficulties
because it contains features that obviate potential constitu-
tional concerns. A private plaintiff who seeks relief for mis-
representation must show that he reasonably relied on the
false statement and consequently suffered actual injury.
Those requirements limit the prospect of liability to cases that
implicate the government's interests in preventing fraud and
compensating injured individuals, and thereby ensure that the
lawsuit does not chill protected expression. Similarly, the
government's traditional means of regulating false advertis-
ing present no First Amendment difficulties. The govern-
ment's enforcement powers are constrained by statutory and
institutional limitations that avoid intrusions on protected
speech.
161
In other words, what was problematic about this case was the fact
that it was brought by a private party, purportedly acting on the
public's behalf, rather than by a state attorney general, whose of-
fice was regulated by law in such a way as to prevent the kind of
abuses evidenced in this case. Of course, if that problem was
cured and the same action were to be brought by a state attorney
general, then there would be no legal problem in the Solicitor
General's view. The argument could be enough to help Nike, but
it offered little consolation to those who expected a more protec-
tive commercial-speech brief to be filed by the Administration.
The Solicitor General's argument was undercut in some peo-
ple's minds by the amicus brief submitted on Kasky's behalf by
16o Brief of Amici Curiae United States at 27, Nike (No. 02-575).
161 Id. at 7.
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the attorneys general of eighteen states and of the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico. In that brief, California Attorney General Lockyer
argued:
The California Supreme Court properly found that a seller
may propose a commercial transaction with statements about
factors other than product characteristics; for example, a
seller may focus on who, how, or where a product is made.
Specific statutes have long prohibited misrepresentations
about the circumstances or context of a product's manufac-
ture or sale. For example, state law proscribes false or mis-
leading statements regarding whether products were made by
blind workers, American Indians, or union labor. Neither the
source, sponsorship of a product, nor the affiliation or certifi-
cation of a seller may be misrepresented. Special rules also
govern untrue or misleading statements regarding how a
product was produced, such as claims that a product was
made or can be used or disposed in an environmentally sound
manner or that food is 'organic' or 'dolphin safe.' Various
laws ensure that where a product was produced is honestly
stated.'62
This argument suggested that an action such as Kasky's might
well be commenced by a state attorney general.1 63 In Lockyer's
mind, consumers needed to be protected because:
Consumers may prefer to purchase products from companies
that protect the environment, support the symphony or the lo-
cal high school basketball team, avoid cruelty to animals in
product testing, underwrite tutoring programs for inner-city
youth, or finance cancer research. A false statement of fact
that products were produced by disabled army veterans or
were not produced by the forced labor of Chinese Christian
religious dissidents may be more important to consumers
than price or product quality in determining whether to pur-
chase a product. Indeed, Nike's alleged misleading press re-
leases and public letters about its labor practices were created
directly to 'advance an economic transaction' with consum-
ers concerned about the labor conditions in overseas facto-
ries.' 64
162 Brief of Amici Curiae States of California et al. at 12-14, Nike (No. 02-575).
163 The Public Citizen amicus brief argued as much: "[1If the California Attorney General
had brought this case, surely the First Amendment would not shield Nike from liability for any
factual representations that were proven false." Brief of Amici Curiae Public Citizen at 14-15,
Nike (No. 02-575).
I64 Brief of Amici Curiae States of California et al. at 14, Nike (No. 02-575).
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But any protection consumers may need, argued Bruce John-
son on behalf of the media, was ably and fully provided in this
case by the print press and the electronic media. As Johnson and
the co-authors of his amicus brief put it:
The record and the press coverage related to this case under-
score the imprudence of the California Supreme Court's de-
cision. Although the purported linchpin of Respondent's
complaint is that Nike has deceived the public by making
misleading statements to the press regarding its business op-
erations, Respondent himself acknowledges that '[t]he media
have continued to expose Nike's actual practices.' Indeed, a
review of contemporaneous press coverage of Nike reveals
that every single one of Nike's allegedly misleading state-
ments either was never reported or was challenged by coun-
terspeech in the same media outlet. This is what one would
expect regarding an issue of intense public concern, and it
leaves one at a loss as for why state regulation is necessary or
appropriate in this area.
65
Members of Congress, specifically Representatives Dennis J.
Kucinich (D-Ohio), Bernard Sanders (D-Vt.), Corrine Brown (D-
Fla.), and Bob Filner (D-Ca.), weighed in on Kasky's behalf, with
Professors Erwin Chemerinsky and Catherine Fisk serving as their
counsel. 166 Their brief was not confident of the power of the First
Amendment marketplace, even when aided by the press, to safe-
guard consumers: "The distinction between commercial and non-
commercial speech is important and necessary because the mar-
ketplace of ideas will not protect consumers from the harms of
false statements."'
' 67
Sensitive to that very concern, the Public Citizen brief sug-
gested that if the Court were to treat Nike's statements as some-
thing other than commercial speech subject to regulation, such a
ruling would have a profound and even detrimental impact on con-
sumer welfare:
[T]o give full First Amendment protection to Nike's market-
ing speech merely because it appeals to consumers based on
social or political preferences would require the Court to en-
gage in difficult and unjustified line-drawing concerning a
vast array of consumer choices. Many product characteristics
165 Brief of Amici Curiae Thirty-Two Leading Newspapers et al. at 18, Nike (No. 02-575)
(quoting Complaint at 19, Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002) (No. 994446)).
166Brief of Amici Curiae Members of the United States Congress, Representative Dennis
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that do not directly affect consumers are accepted bases for
marketing and purchasing products. For example, federal
law requires that products bearing the label "Made in USA"
must in fact have been made in the United States. Consum-
ers look for such labels based in part on a belief that U.S.-
made products will be produced in compliance with labor-
friendly wage, labor, or health and safety laws. Surely, con-
sumer purchasing choices influenced by this label are no dif-
ferent from consumer choices influenced by whether a prod-
uct is made according to the production characteristics touted
in Nike' s statements.
Their argument continued:
Similarly, a consumer's choice when buying an automobile
may be influenced by concern about the environmental effect
of vehicle emissions-for example, some people pay more
for hybrid cars because they produce fewer emissions. Under
Nike's theory, however, public debate over whether vehicle
emissions increase global warming would warrant extending
First Amendment protection to an auto manufacturer's false
marketing claims about reduced emissions from its vehicles.
Other examples of product claims regarding characteristics
that do not bear directly on tangible product characteristics,
but unquestionably affect purchasing decisions, include "dol-
phin-free" tuna (tuna caught using nets that do not harm dol-
phins), "green" labels indicating products produced in ways
that meet certain environmental standards, products bearing a
"union label," and representations that products were not
tested on animals.
169
Such arguments could very much influence the way the Jus-
tices approached the central free-speech issue in the case: namely,
the definition of commercial speech.
The key question, beyond the nagging jurisdictional one for
Nike, was simple to pose, but difficult to answer: What is com-
mercial speech? Is it no more than speech that proposes a com-
mercial transaction? If so, what does it mean to propose a com-
mercial transaction? How specific does the proposal have to be,
how distant does the hoped-for transaction have to be?
168 Brief of Amici Curiae Public Citizen at 22, Nike (No. 02-575) (citation omitted).
1
69 Id. at 22-23.
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Professors Chemerinsky and Fisk offered this definitional an-
swer to those questions in the amicus brief they filed with the Su-
preme Court:
[T]his Court has identified three characteristics that distin-
guish commercial from noncommercial speech: (1) whether
the communication is an advertisement; (2) whether it con-
cerns a product; and (3) whether the speaker has an economic
motivation. In addition, this Court has explicitly held that the
fact that the speech concerns public issues is not sufficient to
take it out of the realm of commercial speech for to do so
would enable a company "to immunize false or misleading.
product information from government regulation simply by
including references to public issues."'
170
By contrast, Professor Robert O'Neil argued in his amicus
brief that there was no definitional problem because there was no
commercial speech, properly understood:
The ruling of the [California Supreme] court below reflects a
dangerously truncated interpretation and application of the
doctrine of commercial speech; it presumes that statements
which might enhance the appeal of commercial products
(even though focused on the speaker's "operations" rather
than on products per se) must for that reason be treated as
"commercial speech" and thus receive substantially lesser
First Amendment protection. To the contrary, many judg-
ments of this Court recognize that not all statements which
may pertain to a commercial product, or which may be of in-
terest to consumers of that product, are properly classified as
commercial speech and for that reason deprived of full con-
stitutional protection. 171
Despite the flurry of interest-editorial, scholarly, lawyerly,
and judicial-in the First Amendment issues raised by the Nike
case, the gatekeeper issue was the jurisdictional one. On that
score, more than half of Paul Hoeber's reply brief addressed
threshold procedural issues, 72 buttressed by forceful analytical and
doctrinal support by the amicus briefs submitted by Alan Morri-
son, David Vladeck and their colleagues at Public Citizen, 7 3 and
170 Brief of Amici Curiae Members of the United States Congress, Representative Dennis
J. Kucinich et al. at 7, Nike (No. 02-575) (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463
U.S. 60, 68 (1983)).
171 Brief of Amici Curiae Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression
and the Media Institute at 5, Nike (No. 02-575).
172 Reply Brief for the Petitioners, Nike (No. 02-575).
173 Brief of Amici Curiae Public Citizen at 22, Nike (No. 02-575).
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by Erwin Chemerinsky and Catherine Fisk in their brief on behalf
of four members of Congress. 174 After all, this was the Respon-
dent's best argument. Then again, the Court did grant review in
the case; not a good omen for the lawyers who challenged the
Court's jurisdiction. Was that the end of the matter? Or could
Paul Hoeber and his amicus allies turn things around? Could they
persuade the Justices to reconsider the issue during oral argu-
ments? In sports vernacular, it was akin to making a turn-around
jump shot.
C. Oral Arguments in the Supreme Court
[A] successful oral argument is more like a compelling
conversation than a lecture ....
-- Charles Fried
175
On the morning of Wednesday, April 23, 2003, Paul Hoeber
found himself in a familiar setting, to which he had first come
some three decades earlier when he served as a law clerk to one of
the Court's greatest free-speech champions, Justice William J.
Brennan, Jr. In those days, Hoeber sat, as did all the clerks, off to
the far right of the Court chamber and listened attentively to scores
of oral arguments while busily taking notes in longhand. And
what he heard then, as he would hear now, was the customary
statement by the Chief Justice and the customary reply by counsel
for the petitioner:
Chief Justice William Rehnquist: We'll hear argument now in
Number 02-575, Nike, Inc. versus Marc Kasky. Mr. Tribe.
Laurence Tribe: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the
Court. 176
The Harvard professor had thirty-five minutes in which to ar-
gue his case before the nine Justices. Court practice has it that
lawyers must not read their arguments. Tribe, a seasoned Court
174 Brief of Amici Curiae Members of the United States Congress, Representative Dennis
J. Kucinich et al., Nike (No. 02-575).
1
7
5 Charles Fried, Oral Argument, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 612 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992).
176 Tr. of Oral Arguments at 3, Nike (No. 02-575), available at
http:llwww.supremecourtus.gov/oraLarguments/argumenttranscripts/02-575.pdf. One of the
authors, Ronald Collins, was present for oral arguments and took notes identifying which
speaker said what. Thus, the identities of the Justices have been added to this manuscript and do
not appear in the original transcript.
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lawyer, knew that. He also knew he had to present his case in a
way that persuasively dodged the rhetorical arrows fired at him
both by the Court and by opposing counsel. Oral argument in the
Supreme Court is, if nothing else, a cerebral exercise where the
rules of the mind govern. It epitomizes the Socratic method. Of
course, as in Socrates' day, the strongest argument does not always
prevail. Biases do matter, misperceptions do occur, and prece-
dents are sometimes ignored. Still, at a minimum, Laurence Tribe
had to have the methodical mind of Aristotle and the polish of
Daniel Webster (one of the Court's most able advocates) to best
secure any chance of victory.
Almost five years to the day after Marc Kasky filed suit
against Nike, Hoeber watched Tribe begin his dialectical dance.
Polished, professional, polite, and so in command of the facts and
law, Tribe was every bit what his reputation had made him out to
be. He was, by any measure, a formidable, though not unbeatable,
opponent.
Essentially, Tribe declared, Nike had involved itself in "an in-
tense debate on the pros and cons of globalization." 177 When the
company's critics used the media to bill it as an exploitative
Southeast Asian employer, Nike used the same media to "docu-
ment what it thought were the connections between its presence
and activities in countries like South Korea and Vietnam and the
development of technological expertise in those countries, as well
as the expansion of job opportunities there."' 178 Rather than engag-
ing in commercial speech to hawk its wares, Nike was defending
itself in "a lively political dialogue about the realities of the Third
World and Nike's role in it.'
179
Within minutes of Tribe's opening, the relentless questioning
began; that, of course, was what he had awaited with great and
confident anticipation. One lively exchange between Justice
O'Connor and the counselor challenged his characterization of
Nike's statements as political speech:
Justice O'Connor: [B ut this Court has said that even though
commercial speech concerns a public issue, it's still commer-
cial speech .... We said that in Central Hudson, we said that
in Bolger .... How do you distinguish those?
177Id.
178 Id. at 3-4.
179 Id. at 4.
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Laurence Tribe: First of all the Court has never said that the
Constitution and its First Amendment are wholly invisible to
commercial speech .... [T]he whole approach of the Court
below and of Mr. Kasky was, we don't even have to deal
with your First Amendment arguments . . . because it's mis-
leading commercial speech.
Justice O'Connor: [N]one of the things alleged in the com-
plaint meet the commercial speech test set out in Central
Hudson?. . . Not one of them?
Laurence Tribe: That's right, Justice O'Connor, we don't
think any of them do.
180
When asked about the letter sent by Nike to university presi-
dents and athletic department directors who purchase athletic
equipment, Tribe admitted that only those communications came
close to commercial speech. Even so, the letter "is an extended
argument about why the claims against Nike are unfounded."
Tribe added that Kasky "does not have standing to sue on behalf of
the athletic directors," because "this is a law where you're sup-
posed to represent the public, not sophisticated organizations, be-
cause they might have their own interests."
'' 81
As if the celebrated Professor's mention of "standing" had
closed one conceptual door and opened another, the Court's line of
questioning immediately moved from substance to procedure. The
Justices showed a marked concern over the oddities of the Califor-
nia law that recognized citizens, like Kasky, as private attorneys
general with the capacity to challenge corporate advertising prac-
tices without having to demonstrate that they had suffered any per-
sonalized harm. Justice David Souter directed his first query to
that point:
Justice Souter: I thought your best reason was that there
is... in fact no allegation that anyone among the plaintiffs
or ... the class on behalf of which they sue, the public, was
injured in any demonstrable way. Is that the point?
Laurence Tribe: That's probably the single strongest
point .... [I]magine a law that said, if you utter a defamatory
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gag order. Even if the Attorney General administered it,
you'd need to have a possible victim.
I mean, if someone says bad things about William Shake-
speare, and the State of California decides that it is going to
have a general, floating power to correct speech not con-
nected with the regulatory responsibilities of any agency like
the FIFC... or the SEC .... we think that would be constitu-
tionally infirm, but in this case, in any event, it doesn't come
close to commercial speech. 1
82
Reserving three minutes for rebuttal, Tribe yielded the floor at
11:32 a.m. to Solicitor General Theodore Olson. When Olson had
entered the courtroom earlier that morning, he had leaned over the
counsel table and hugged Tribe.' 83 It was a gesture steeped in
symbolic meaning. The last time the two lawyers had appeared
together in the high Court's chambers, they had argued on opposite
sides in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board,184 a heated
constitutional struggle over the Florida 2000 presidential election
dispute. Now they were allied, together defending Nike against
the constraints of California's consumer-protection law.
By its statutes, Olson contended,
California has transferred its governmental authority to regu-
late marketplace communications to anyone and everyone
who possesses the price of the filing fee. Unelected, unac-
countable private enforcers, uninhibited by established no-
tions of concrete harm or public duty, have the power to ad-
vance their own agendas or personal ideological battles by
launching complex, burdensome, and expensive litiga-
tion.... [Such] in terrorem effect and potential for abuse is
difficult to overstate .... [A]nyone with a whim or a griev-
ance and a filing fee can become a Government-licensed cen-
sor. 185
Whether the Solicitor General's argument against Kasky's
standing for lack of personalized harm had scored any points for
Nike, however, was uncertain given the Justices' reactions. "What
will happen," Justice Breyer predicted, is that consumer-protection
advocates would "find in five minutes somebody who bought some
1
82 Id. at 15, 20.
183 Notes taken by Ronald Collins on April 23, 2003, at Nike, Inc. v. Kasky oral arguments
(on file with authors).
1- 531 U.S. 70 (2000).
185 Tr. of Oral Arguments at 22-23, Nike (No. 02-575).
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Nike shoes who feels the same way.., so you'll just have this ex-
act suit with a different plaintiff."'' 86 With his observation, Justice
Breyer highlighted the narrowness of the Solicitor General's ra-
tionale-an argument that benefited Nike this time, while preserv-
ing federal and state regulatory powers to reach any false or mis-
leading expression.
Now it was the Respondent's turn. "Mr. Hoeber, we'll hear
from you,"'187 declared the Chief Justice. That was his cue, his for-
mal invitation to approach the lectern at 11:43 a.m. Could Hoeber
do here what he had done in the California Supreme Court and
steal an expected victory away from Nike? Sure of himself and in
his cause, he proceeded to argue his first case in the highest Court
in the land.
Hoeber insisted that Nike's contested claims involved verifi-
able facts about its production processes and, as such, amounted to
commercial speech. "[T]he company is making representations to
consumers about its own practices for the purpose of convincing
those consumers that they should buy the company's products, so
it is commercial speech in that sense.' 88 Nike's statements in-
volved no significant public debate: "[T]he only debate that's in
[Kasky's] complaint, is the debate over what, in fact, was going on
in the shoe factories, what in fact, were the conditions .... [That is
a far cry from] a public debate about a larger public issue."
189
Hoeber's characterizations raised the cerebral heat a bit, as
one Justice after another heaped fuel onto the fire of skepticism.
The Chief Justice questioned whether the doctrinal distinctions
offered by Kasky's counsel made any difference "for First
Amendment purposes."' 19 Justice O'Connor challenged whether
any of Nike' s statements were "advertising in the true sense of that
term." 9' Justice Breyer disputed the idea that Nike's rhetoric
could be disposed of as simply commercial: "[T]he truth of the
matter is, I think it's both. You know, it's both. They're both try-
ing to sell their product and they're trying to make a statement
that's relevant to a public debate."' 92 In the face of this barrage,
Hoeber held his ground and urged the Court to expand the defini-
tion of commercial speech to cover "a lot of promotions and a lot
1
86 Id. at 24.
18 7 Id. at 30.
88 1d. at 51.
189Id. at 50-51.
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of communications that consumers rely on.''1 3 That argument car-
ried no force for Justice Scalia: "Yes. It's not a perfect world."'194
Based on the oral arguments alone, the best refuge for Marc
Kasky was, perhaps, a jurisdictional one-that the Court might
reconsider its grant of certiorari in this case. As to the merits of
Hoeber's First Amendment arguments, the Justices did not seem
overly impressed. They might have left the audience wondering
whether Nike v. Kasky 195 would become to First Amendment law
what DeFunis v. Odegaard'9 6 had become to affirmative action
law: an unrealized landmark.
In his three minutes of rebuttal, Laurence Tribe once again hit
hard on the use of the California statutory scheme to "stifle and
silence the public debate." The consumer-protection law was thus
transformed into "a conversation-stopper," something "extraordi-
nary." He concluded by pointing to the burdens that the law
placed on media: "If you look at the media brief [written by Bruce
Johnson and others], the media are now saying that businesses
around the world are already afraid to communicate with us be-
cause California may get them .... "'97
Chief Justice Rehnquist: Thank you, Mr. Tribe. The case is
submitted. 1
98
While the arguments played out in the courtroom, Nike dem-
onstrators protested in front of the great, pillared edifice of Ameri-
can justice. Before, during, and after oral arguments, protesters
stood next to a ten-foot long, cardboard Nike sneaker emblazoned
with the trademarked "swoosh" and the words "STOP NIKE /
PROTECT OUR CONSTITUTION." The shoe was situated atop a
mock copy of the Constitution bearing the words "We the
P e opl e." One young person carried an American flag, while
another carried a sign, reading "Tell the truth, just do it." Nike,




'9' 123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003).
19 416 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1974) (discussing the jurisprudential barrier to determination of
a 14th Amendment affirmative action claim).
197 Tr. of Oral Arguments at 63, Nike (No. 02-575).
198 Id.
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tion."'199 Throughout it all, as with the oral arguments, Marc Kasky
was nowhere to be seen or heard.
As Tribe, Dellinger, and Goldstein exited the Court, they were
met by reporters eager to receive their assessment of the proceed-
ings. An informal press conference was held, with all three an-
swering a variety of questions, as news cameras captured their im-
ages and words. Veda Manager, Nike's PR person, was there, as
was Jim Carter, Nike's general counsel. Bruce Johnson, who had
flown in from Seattle, was there, too. During the give-and-take
with the press, Tribe told a Fox News TV reporter: "No court is a
guardian of the public mind., 20 0 He told another reporter from The
Oregonian that his hope was that the "justices will realize that they
can get away from the details of commercial speech definitions in
cases where it is close." He then added: "This might seem like a
pretty easy case, surprisingly.
'" 20 1
Paul Hoeber, like his client, was strikingly absent. The only
speech for their side was the symbolic cardboard shoe stomping on
the Constitution. From the beginning, both the client and his law-
yers kept a low profile, leaving groups like ReclaimDemocracy.org
to take the lead in speaking to the public. It was all done now ex-
cept for the evening news, the next-day papers, and the Court's
opinion in the matter.
Reporting for the New York Times, veteran Court reporter
Linda Greenhouse portrayed the situation as promising for the
shoe maker: "Nike found a sympathetic audience at the Supreme
Court . . . for the argument that its defense of its overseas labor
practices was the kind of speech that the First Amendment protects
to the fullest extent, regardless of whether the speaker is a corpora-
tion. '' z°2 Tony Mauro, another Court veteran, shared that assess-
ment: "At the end of 70 minutes of oral argument yesterday, the
Supreme Court appeared ready to agree that under the First
Amendment, Nike should not be subjected to a lawsuit by Califor-
nia activist Marc Kasky. ' 'z 3 Charles Lane, writing for the Wash-
199Frank J. Murray, Justices Dismiss Nike Motives, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2003, at 3A
(story and photograph of the shoe and protesters); Bill Mears, Supreme Court Looks at Free
Speech Rights of Corporate America, CNN LAW CENTER, June 27, 2003, at
www.cnn.con2003/LAW/04/23/scotus.free.speech/ (describing the protests) (last visited Apr.
18, 2004).
2°°Noted by Ronald Collins, Apr. 24, 2003, Washington, D.C., in front of Supreme Court
(on file with author).
201 Jim Barnett, Supreme Court Hears Nike Case, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, April 24, 2003,
at C1, 2003 WL 3814345.
202 Linda Greenhouse, Nike, Fighting Trade Suit, Asks Justices for Free-Speech Protection,
N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2003, at 28A, LEXIS, News & Business, News, By Individual Publica-
tion, N, The New York Times.
203 Tony Mauro, High Court Appears Ready to Side with Nike in Free-Speech Dispute,
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ington Post, was more guarded: "[T]he tone of yesterday's hearing
was subdued. By the end, it was unclear whether a majority was
prepared to rule broadly in favor of enhancing the constitutional
status of commercial speech or to dispose of the case on a nar-
rower legal basis. ' 2°
At best, Phil Knight and Jim Carter could be guardedly opti-
mistic. The finest lawyers in the land could not have made Nike's
chances any better given the procedural posture of the case. It was
time to take stock and head back home to the Pacific Northwest.
Meanwhile, Nike's critics were busy creating their own news
for the next day's headlines. In San Francisco, a citizen rally
"against sweatshops" was underway. The public protest took place
at Niketown in Union Square on the same morning as the Supreme
Court oral arguments. It was a combination of demonstrations,
street theatre, and press conferences. The rally had been organized
by members of the Global Exchange, Corpwatch, Sweatshop
Watch, ReclaimDemocracy.org, Friends of the Earth, the Women's
International League for Peace and Freedom, and the Sierra Club.
Those who gathered aimed for the press to bash Nike yet again.2°5
Congressman Dennis Kucinich was also in San Francisco on
the same day. In a prepared statement, he said: "I'm pleased that
Nike has decided to become concerned about the liberties provided
for in the United States Constitution. Unfortunately, their interest
in the First Amendment came about right about the same time their
own audit revealed factual misstatements to consumers." He
added: "[I]t is absolutely critical that the Supreme Court clarifies
that there is no Constitutional right of corporations to distort the
truth. , 2°
What the Court would do was anyone's guess. That did not,
however, stop the pundits from making predictions of all kinds.
Still, as the adage has it, those who predict the future should be
prepared to eat broken glass. And as everyone soon discovered,
there was a lot of broken glass to be consumed.
FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER, Apr. 24, 2003, at www.firstamendmentcenter.org/analy-
sis.aspx?id=1 1384.
2
04 Charles Lane, Supreme Court Considers Nike's 'Free Speech', WASH. POST, April 24,
2003, at 2E, 2003 WL 18819944.205 The information about the Niketown rally is set out in an April 18, 2003 press re-
lease/media advisory. Press Release, Reclaim Democracy.Org & Global Exchange, Citizens
Rally in Defense of "Truth in Advertising" Laws and Against Corporate Claims of a Constitu-
tional "Right to Lie" (Apr. 18, 2003) (on file with authors).
2
0
6 Kucinich Speaks Out at UC Berkeley Against War, HOTLINE, April 24, 2003, LEXIS,
News & Business, News, News Group, All.
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D. The Court Acts
Free speech is the loser here.
-- Ann Brick
207
[Ilt will inevitably be overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court.
-- Thomas Goldstein 208
The October 2002 Court Term was a blockbuster one. Be-
tween October 2002 and June 2003, the Justices had wrestled with
complex and controversial questions. They had ruled on affirma-
tive action2 9 gay rights,21° cross burning, 1 campaign financing,212
the internet and child pornography,1 3 family-medical leave,214 and
the constitutionality of the 1998 Copyright Term Extension Act.215
By any measure, this was a term to remember.
"Opinion days" are quite often frantic times around the Court,
for it is on those days that the Court's press corps hovers around
the Public Information Office to receive copies of the Court's lat-
est opinions. The press receives no advance copies of the deci-
sions. Not until 10:00 a.m. on an opinion day are the opinions
made public. At that time, many reporters return hurriedly to their
assigned cubicles in the nearby pressroom on the ground floor.
Most of them have but minutes to digest and then explain what the
Court has just decided. Indeed, the press had much to write about
that term, but not about commercial speech.
Among the five opinions handed down on June 26, 2003, the
least important was the one in Case No. 02-575, Nike, Inc. v.
Kasky. Sixty-four days after the matter had been argued, the Court
issued its one-line per curiam opinion: "The writ of certiorari is
dismissed as improvidently granted. 21 6
They beat the odds. Paul Hoeber, Alan Caplan, and their
lawyerly cohorts had defeated the great Nike. They had snatched
20
7 Harriet Chiang, Court Says Nike Must Defend Its PR: Free Speech Doesn't Protect La-
bor Claims, S.F. CHRON., May 3, 2002, at Al, 2002 WL 4019444.
208 Goldstein, supra note 1, at 64.
209Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
210 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
211 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
212 McConnell v. F.E.C., 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003).21
3 United States v. Am. Library Ass'n., 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
214 Nev. Dep't. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
215 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
216 123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003).
2004]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
victory away from their powerful rival, much as they had done in
the California Supreme Court. Though they had ample reason to
be gleeful, the case was not over yet. The legal fight would now
have to return to the California courts.
With the Supreme Court's dismissal of its writ, Nike, Inc. v.
Kasky ironically became a decision suited, not for First Amend-
ment casebooks, but for Federal Courts casebooks. Given the ju-
risdictional debates at the core of both Justice Steven's concurring
opinion (joined by Ginsburg and Souter) and Justice Breyer's
opinion dissenting from the dismissal (joined by O'Connor), it was
apparent that the procedural hurdles that had dominated the dis-
course at oral arguments became insurmountable obstacles for a
seven-member majority of the Court.21 7 Not even Justice Thomas,
the Court's most ardent defender of heightened protection for
commercial speech,1 8 elected to leap over the procedural barriers
to decide this significant corporate speech case.
Notably, a majority of the Court-the three concurring and
the two dissenting Justices-rejected the California Supreme
Court's holding that Nike's communications could be labeled pure
commercial speech. Justice Steven's concurring opinion declared
that "the speech at issue represents a blending of commercial
speech, noncommercial speech and debate on an issue of public
217 Ostensibly, there were two jurisdictional concerns that ultimately doomed Nike. First,
the California Supreme Court never entered a final judgment. The U.S. Supreme Court, how-
ever, does accept jurisdiction in certain exceptional "situations in which the highest court of a
State has finally determined the federal issue present in a particular case, but in which there are
further proceedings in the lower state courts to come." Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S.
469, 477 (1975). Given the interlocutory posture of the Nike case, however, the Court could
have taken a number of paths that would neither preclude further proceedings in the state courts
nor finally resolve the First Amendment questions in this case. Seemingly, then, the judgment
of the California Supreme Court did not come within the purview of the Cox exception and,
thus, could not be regarded as final.
The second jurisdictional issue involved the standing of either Nike or Kasky to invoke ju-
risdiction of the federal courts. Kasky had neither asserted a federal claim nor alleged any in-
jury to himself that was "distinct and palpable." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
Moreover, the Court was apparently unwilling to extend the ruling and reasoning of ASARCO,
Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605 (1989), to recognize Article III standing for Nike. Unlike
ASARCO, in which the state court proceedings ended in a declaratory judgment invalidating a
state law, the California Supreme Court had issued no "final judgment altering tangible legal
rights." Id. at 619. Rather, it had held merely that Kasky's complaint was sufficient to survive
Nike's demurrer and to allow the case to go forward. To apply ASARCO to this case would
expand it to cover an interlocutory ruling that only allows a trial to proceed.
219 Compare 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 487 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (discussing the parity between commercial and non-commercial speech for the
government's interest "to keep legal users of a product or service ignorant in order to manipu-
late their choices in the marketplace"), with Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S.
457, 477 (1997) ("The mere fact that one or more producers 'do not wish to foster' generic
advertising of their product is not a sufficient reason for overriding the judgment of the majority
of market participants, bureaucrats, and legislators who have concluded that such programs are
beneficial." (emphasis added)).
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importance., 219 Likewise, Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion con-
cluded that "the communications at issue are not purely commer-
cial in nature," but rather are best "characterized as involving a
mixture of commercial and noncommercial (public-issue-oriented)
elements."22°
Still, only Justices Breyer and O'Connor were willing to take
up a lance for First Amendment protection of Nike's communica-
tions. Essentially, the two Justices rejected a bright-lined cate-
gorical approach for analysis of commercial expression. They
challenged the traditional doctrinal dichotomy between political
and commercial speech as insufficiently nuanced to provide ade-
quate constitutional safeguard for Nike's public-issue-oriented dis-
course.
Although Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion did not invoke
the analogy, his thinking is reminiscent of what the Court has de-
manded in obscenity cases: that a work be "taken as a whole" to be
deemed obscene.221 As heightened scrutiny is required where sex-
ual expression commingles with valuable literary, artistic, scien-
tific, or political expression, by a similar logic Breyer and
O'Connor would have applied a "public-speech principle" to ac-
cord heightened scrutiny in cases where commercial expression
commingles with valuable public speech.222 The dissenters' "pub-
lic-speech principle," however, was significantly different from the
commingling analysis in the obscenity context, as the mere mix-
ture of commercial and non-commercial speech would not alone
trigger heightened scrutiny. Rather, Breyer's opinion identified
"three sets of circumstances" that must all be present for Nike-like
communications to be protected: predominantly non-commercial
"circumstances of format, content, and regulatory context. ' 223
Analyzing "[t]he document least likely to warrant protec-
tion, 224 the Nike letter to university presidents and athletic direc-
tors, Breyer found that it deserved full First Amendment protection
under his three-sets-of-circumstances standard. First, the letter
appeared "outside a traditional advertising format, such as a brief
television or newspaper advertisement.', 225  Second, the letter's
content concerned matters of "significant public interest" and con-
219 Nike, 123 S. Ct. at 2558 (Stevens, J., concurring).
22o Id. at 2565 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
221 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (emphasis added).
222 123 S. Ct. at 2565 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
223 
1d. at 2566. One of the participants in this Symposium lauds the speech-protective
qualities of Justice Breyer's dissent, but omits any discussion of the restrictive character of the
three-sets-of-circumstances standard developed there. See La Fetra, supra note 64, at 1211-13.
224 123 S. Ct. at 2565.
225 Id. (emphasis added).
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veyed factual details related to an active public controversy. "In
particular," Breyer wrote, "the letter describes Nike's labor prac-
tices and responds to criticism of those practices, and it does so
because those practices themselves play an important role in an
existing public debate. 226 As such, Nike's statements must be dis-
tinguished from those that are purely commercial: "The speech
here is unlike speech-say, the words 'dolphin-safe tuna'-that
commonly appears in more traditional advertising or labeling con-
texts. And it is unlike instances of speech where a communica-
tion's contribution to public debate is peripheral, not central.22 7
Third, the regulatory context element in Breyer's standard was
tailor-made for the Nike case. Echoing what Solicitor General 01-
son had argued before the Court,228 Breyer noted that "the regula-
tory regime at issue here differs from traditional speech regulation
in its use of private attorneys general authorized to impose 'false
advertising' liability even though they themselves have suffered no
harm.
229
To illustrate the particularity of Breyer's and O'Connor's
standard, consider what might have happened, for example, if the
third factor were missing, and the same action had been brought by
the California Attorney General.23° Would Breyer and O'Connor
nonetheless have protected Nike's speech under heightened scru-
tiny review? Recall that Breyer believes that only when "all three"
circumstances "are present" does "the First Amendment demand[]
heightened scrutiny. 23' In essence, Justice Breyer's dissent is
hardly a clarion call for enhanced protection of commercial
speech. Rather, once broken down, its test-if one can call it
that-seems to apply to the facts of this case, and this case only.
Perhaps that explains why Justice Thomas did not sign on to the
standard endorsed by Justices Breyer and O'Connor, two of the
weakest defenders of First Amendment liberties on the Rehnquist
Court. 32
2
26 Id. at 2566.
227 Id. (citation omitted).
228 Brief of Amici Curiae United States, Nike (No. 02-575).
229 123 S. Ct. at 2566 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
230 Interestingly, the California Attorney General filed an amicus brief in the Supreme
Court to support Kasky's position. See Brief of Amici Curiae States of California et al., Nike
(No. 02-575).
231 123 S. Ct. at 2566 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
232 According to Professor Eugene Volokh's analysis of the current Justices' voting records
in free-speech cases from 1994 to 2002, Justice Breyer ranks last in sustaining such claims,
while Justice O'Connor ranks seventh. Eugene Volokh, How the Justices Voted in Free Speech
Cases, 1994 to 2002, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1191, 1193 (2001), http://wwwl.law.ucla.edu/
-volokh/howvoted.htm.
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In contrast to the dissenters, the concurring Justices would not
judge the merits of Nike's free-speech claims; however, they were
willing to sketch out their views on the merits of what they thought
to be an important issue. Notwithstanding precedents such as
233 234Bigelow233 and Consolidated Edison, such a "blending" of corn-
mercial and noncommercial speech nevertheless seemed to the
concurring Justices to place Nike in a special category, one not
heretofore examined by the Court and, therefore, not directly con-
trolled by existing doctrine. That such blending occurred in the
context of a "debate on an issue of public importance" also sug-
gested that at least three Justices might be receptive to fashioning a
rule more speech-protective than the Central Hudson four-pronged
test.235 Then again, the same three also had concerns of a notably
different order:
On the one hand, if the allegations of the complaint are true,
direct communications with customers and potential custom-
ers that were intended to generate sales-and possibly to
maintain or enhance the market value of Nike's stock-
contained significant factual misstatements. The regulatory
interest in protecting market participants from being misled
by such misstatements is of the highest order. That is why we
have broadly (perhaps over broadly) stated that "there is no
constitutional value in false statements of fact.
236
Part of what is telling about this last statement is the concern
the trio expressed for "market participants." At the outset, it may
be noteworthy that Justice Stevens did not invoke the more famil-
iar term consumer,237 but instead tapped Commerce Clause termi-
nology.238 This raises the question, and perhaps it is only that, of
23 3 Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (upholding commercial speech protection for
an abortion clinic advertisement).
2m Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980) (invalidating a state
regulation forbidding public utilities from inserting public policy statements in their electric bill
mailings).
23
5 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566-571 (1980).
236 Nike, 123 S. Ct. at 2558-59 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (quoting Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974)).
237 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 496 (1996) ("In accord with the
role that commercial messages have long played, the law has developed to ensure that advertis-
ing provides consumers with accurate information about the availability of goods and services."
(emphasis added)); id. at 499 ("Our decision [in Central Hudson] acknowledged the special
features of commercial speech but identified the serious First Amendment concerns that attend
blanket advertising prohibitions that do not protect consumers from commercial harms." (em-
phasis added)).
238 See, e.g., Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 440 (1980) (holding South Dakota acted
as a "market participant" in administering a residence preference program for the sale of cement
and consequently the program did not violate the Commerce Clause).
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whether those in need of protection, albeit of the "highest order,"
are not merely those who consume a particular product but also
those who go into the marketplace to receive information. That
they participate in that marketplace is sufficient, even if they do
not consume any given product, to trigger the state's interest in
protecting them from misleading statements. Is this but another
way of saying that their interest (like that of Marc Kasky) does not
depend on a showing of some kind of particularized harm as con-
sumers? And note that such marketplace paternalism is a matter of
the "highest order" and therefore trumps all other concerns, includ-
ing those involving free speech.
Whatever one makes of such statements, it is obvious that, in
Justice Stevens' almost schizophrenically-divided perspective,
there was more to the matter:
On the other hand, the communications were part of an ongo-
ing discussion and debate about important public issues that
was concerned not only with Nike's labor practices, but with
similar practices used by other multinational corporations.
Knowledgeable persons should be free to participate in such
debate without fear of unfair reprisal. The interest in protect-
ing such participants from the chilling effect of the prospect
of expensive litigation is therefore also a matter of great im-
portance.
239
Such language suggests a constitutional mindset more akin to that
of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
2 40 than of Central Hudson2 41
and its commercial speech progeny. And in Sullivan, it bears not-
ing, the Court required a showing of actual and particularized harm
before liability could attach in the face of a First Amendment
claim. 242 Since "discussion and debate" on "public issues" is a
"matter of great importance," it would hardly seem appropriate to
tailor a rule that would stifle or even silence such debate. By that
First Amendment measure, the commercial speech analysis em-
ployed by the California Supreme Court in Nike would be constitu-
tionally suspect.
But alas, Justice Stevens and his two colleagues could do no
more than offer conflicted hints on how they might rule in a Nike-
like case: "Whether similar protection should extend to cover cor-
porate misstatements made about the corporation itself, or whether
2 39 Nike, 123 S. Ct. at 2559 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citation omitted & emphasis added).
240376 U.S. 254 (1964).
241 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
242 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 267 ("The jury must find that the words were published 'of and
concerning' the plaintiff.").
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we should presume that such a corporate speaker knows where the
truth lies, are questions that may have to be decided in this litiga-
tion. 243 More litigation was thus required. More discovery was
needed to flesh things out. Of course, that was precisely what
Nike feared and precisely what Kasky desired, since once the case
was sent back to the trial court, Kasky could begin his fishing ex-
pedition through countless Nike documents, any one or dozens of
which might incriminate the company.
Incredibly, the political activist had leveled a mighty blow
against the Goliath. Nike was now at Kasky's mercy, if only he
and his lawyers could stay in the game long enough to get past a
bevy of motions designed to keep them out of the treasure trove of
the company's secret files. For the Oregon-based corporation, that
possibility was nightmarish, even if the company's claims proved
true. Not only was such extended discovery likely to be burden-
some, but it also raised the odds that Kasky could find some nega-
tive material to publicize about the company's inner workings.
Jim Carter, Nike's general counsel, had to do something and
quickly. But what? Just when it seemed that Marc Kasky was fi-
nally positioned to strike a blow for the anti-corporate and anti-
sweatshop forces of his world, the unexpected happened.
E. The Parties Settle
The lawsuit projected to mark a new day in commercial
speech doctrine would quickly be forgotten. Absent some First
Amendment precedent in the U.S. Reports, the Nike controversy
would fade into oblivion. And that was exactly what the Beaver-
ton-based company might have desired. At least that is the result
that Nike secured on September 12, 2003, when it agreed to settle
its case with Marc Kasky.244 Jim Carter explained that the com-
pany chose to settle because the federal high Court's dismissal
"left us with no satisfactory comfort that we could get back to the
243 Nike, 123 S. Ct. at 2559 (Stevens, J., concurring).
2" The Nike settlement was reported in a plethora of publications. See, e.g., Associated
Press, Nike Settles Commercial-Speech Case, Sept. 12, 2003, at http://www.firstamendment
center.org/news.aspxid= 11922; Bob Egelko, Nike Settles Suit for $1.5 Million, S.F. CHRON.,
Sept. 13, 2003, at B1, LEXIS, News & Business, News, News, All; Lisa Girion, Nike Settles
Lawsuit over Labor Claims, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2003, at Cl, LEXIS, News & Business,
News, News, All; Boaz Herzog, Nike Settles Free Speech Case for $1.5 Million, OREGONIAN,
Sept. 13, 2003, at A01, LEXIS, News & Business, News, News, All; Adam Liptak, Nike Move
Ends Case over Firms' Free Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2003, at A8, LEXIS, News & Busi-
ness, News, News, All; Nike Settles Commercial Free Speech Case for $1.5 Million, CHATTA-
NOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, Sept. 13, 2003, at C5, LEXIS, News & Business, News, News, All
[hereinafter CHAT'rANOOGA TIMES].
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Supreme Court., 24 5 For Walter Dellinger, one of the company's
Supreme Court lawyers, the future of the case would be bleak:
As much as Nike cared about the 1st Amendment issues, we
realized there was no way to get the 1st Amendment issue
back to the U.S. Supreme Court unless Nike were to lose at
trial and all the way upathe ladder, which is not a very attrac-
tive or likely prospect.
The terms of the otherwise secret settlement were: $1.5 mil-
lion to be paid to the Fair Labor Association, a worker rights group
in Washington, D.C., and at least $500,000 a year in funding paid
for micro-loan programs that subsidize the entrepreneurial ven-
tures of aspiring foreign employees and for educational forums in
247Nike's partner-factories. It remained unknown whether Nike
paid any or all of the substantial litigation costs incurred by
Kasky's lawyers or an award to Kasky himself.248 Likewise, it was
unknown whether there were any restrictions placed on Kasky and
his lawyers regarding public statements about the case or settle-
ment.
What is known, however, is that Nike never conceded that its
contested statements were false and misleading. 249 Even more sig-
nificantly, the settlement "leaves in place a 4-3 decision of the
California Supreme Court that continues to be very troublesome
for companies that participate in debate on public issues, 25 °
Dellinger noted.
Predictably, the well-crafted statements for the press issued
by the adversaries were conciliatory, justificatory, and even cele-
bratory. "Mr. Kasky is satisfied that this settlement reflects Nike's
commitment to positive change where factory workers are con-
cerned,' 25' said his attorney, Patrick Coughlin. "Nike did make a
lot of changes," Coughlin continued, "[ilt brought their attention to
a lot of things, and that was the point of the case. 252 In a similar
tone, Nike spokeswoman Maria Eitel addressed the company's
more sophisticated understanding of the global workers-rights
concerns reflected in the case: "We have learned a great deal in the
five years since this case was first filed about the challenges we
245 Liptak, supra note 244.
2
4Girion, supra note 244.
247 Herzog, supra note 244.
248 Liptak, supra note 244. Whatever the financial reckoning, it amounted to no more than
"a nick for Nike, a company with $10.7 billion in annual revenue." Girion, supra note 244.
249 Uptak, supra note 244.
250 Girion, supra note 244.
251 Associated Press, supra note 244.
252 Girion, supra note 244.
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and others face in addressing issues in manufacturing environ-
ments .,,253
Equally predictable were the laudatory reactions from the
beneficiary of Nike's largesse: the Fair Labor Association (FLA),
which includes 179 universities, human-rights groups, consumer
organizations, and diverse companies.254 Executive Director Auret
van Heerden understood the Nike settlement to reflect a notable
shift in the attitudes and practices of name-brand apparel manufac-
turers:
In the mid-'90s Kathie Lee Gifford was saying she didn't
know what the conditions were in supplier factories; she
didn't own them .... A company like Nike has moved way
beyond that and has agreed that even though it doesn't own
the factories, it will be responsible for conditions in any sup-
plier plant.255
Chiming in happily, Adele Simmons, the chairwoman of the
FLA's board, reveled in the unanticipated gift: "This money will
be used, clearly, to contribute to our work on workers' rights. 256
That sentiment suited Jim Carter, Nike's Vice President and
General Counsel, just fine. In a letter faxed to the organizations
and lawyers who had filed amicus briefs in the Supreme Court,
Carter expressed the company's gratitude for their support and ex-
plained its settlement decision: "As you can imagine," the ever
mild-mannered Carter wrote, "we did not relish the thought of
spending the next several years expending extensive resources liti-
gating the claims raised in the suit ... ." After assessing the situa-
tion, Nike "concluded that settlement that focused on benefits to
workers was the right choice. We firmly believe that this settle-
ment is consistent with our long-term commitment to helping to
improve the lives of workers, their families and their communi-
,,257ties.
Less applause for the settlement came from other corners.
First, there were the critics of Nike's award to the FLA. 8 Jeff
Ballinger, founder of a worker- and consumer-advocacy organiza-
tion, Press for Change, and author of negative reviews of Nike's
253 Associated Press, supra note 244.
2 Id.
255 Girion, supra note 244.
25 Lptak, supra note 244.
257 Faxed letter from Jim Carter, Nike Vice President and General Counsel, to Amici (Sept.
12, 2003) (on file with authors).
258 The following statements of Jeff Ballinger and Kevin Dannher appear in Egelko, supra
note 244.
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labor practices in the 1990s, claimed that the association is "totally
in the pocket of business." In his opinion, the settlement money
should have flowed to overseas factory workers who are otherwise
paid "starvation wages." To the same effect, Kevin Danneher, co-
founder of Global Exchange, a San Francisco-based advocacy
group that had pulled out of the FLA, slammed the organization as
"a corporate front group." "Nike got off real easy," Danneher de-
clared.
Even more troubled were First Amendment experts who ex-
pressed dismay that the California high court's ruling in Nike now
lived on.259 "This was a very troublesome decision," explained
Kevin Goering, a media-law practitioner at New York's Coudert
Brothers. "Its sweeping definition of commercial speech, which
exposed speech [that] plainly concerned a matter of public interest
to liability without fault [for] an individual who hadn't even been
damaged by it, now applies to all speech by corporations that
reaches California." In a similar vein, Nike's Supreme Court co-
counsel Thomas Goldstein shed light on the corporate world's re-
actions to the settlement: "The California rule genuinely frightens
businesses ... because even innocent mistakes made in important
public debates can get you sued. And anyone breathing and in the
state of California can sue."
Such consequences, of course, were like honey to the palate of
anti-globalization activists such as Jeff Milchen of ReclaimDe-
mocracy.org. "Corporations have a legitimate role to play in soci-
ety by doing business," admitted Milchen. Nevertheless, he
praised the added burdens on corporate speech inherent in the
California Supreme Court's decision: "But [corporations] do not
have a legitimate role in influencing public policy. Corporations
do not have any claim to the protection of our Bill of Rights."
Summing it up, Patrick Coughlin, one of Kasky's lawyers, viewed
the results of Nike as exactly right: "We think this will go a long
way toward making people who want to do business in California
speak truthfully."
Beyond all the talk about the Nike-Kasky settlement, there
lingered a disturbing question for the shoe manufacturer: Could the
company be sued by some other anti-sweatshop activist under the
same California statute and based on the same kind of cause of
action? If so, then the settlement with Kasky would be of little
practical consequence since someone else could assume an en-
forcement role as a new private attorney general. But as fate, and
259 The statements of Kevin Goering, Thomas Goldstein, Jeff Milchen, and Patrick
Coughlin in this paragraph and the next appear in Liptak, supra note 244.
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the sage advice of counsel, would have it, the time had already
tolled under California's statute of limitations260 for filing such an
action unless Nike were to make some new statements about the
matter.
Though Nike was out of the litigation picture, the California
Supreme Court's ruling nonetheless remains controlling within the
boundaries of the state and for all businesses that make minimum
contacts there. That ruling means, quite simply, that corporate en-
tities would do well to think twice before entering into any public
debate over concerns about how they do business, lest they be sued
in state court with no realistic possibility of removal to a federal
court.261 As Bob Liodice, president of the Association of National
Advertisers, complained: "While Nike I'm sure is pleased this is
now behind them, for the balance of the industry we're sort of in
'Nowhere Land.'
2 62
That "nowhere land" was "neither ethereal nor abstract," ac-
cording to Bruce W. Sanford and Robert D. Lystad, two noted me-
dia lawyers with the firm of Baker & Hostetler. 263 "After the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court decision," they noted, "Nike took a number
of self-censorship steps. It declined to release its Corporate Re-
sponsibility Report, refused to pursue a listing in the Dow Jones
Sustainability Index, and declined dozens of invitations to speak
on corporate responsibility issues. '' 26
To buttress their claims about the chilling effect of Nike, San-
ford and Lystad offered the following hypothetical:
A drug company announces a cutting-edge treatment for
bone cancer. The media and independent public interest
groups raise questions about the effectiveness of the treat-
ment and its potential side effects. Through press releases
and in response to reporters' inquiries, the company publi-
cizes the results of an independent and legitimate scientific
study it commissioned on the treatment. The company's
characterizations about the results of the study directly con-
tradict other analyses publicized in the news media. A scien-
26OSee CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17208 (West 2000) (setting limitation period of four
years).
261 As Thomas Goldstein has noted, "because plaintiffs in these cases disavow any per-
sonal injury and right to recovery, the suit will almost certainly not be removable to a federal
court .. " Goldstein, supra note 1, at 64 n.7.
2 6 2 
CHATTANOOGA TIMES, supra note 244.
263 Bruce W. Sanford & Robert D. Lystad, The New Vulnerability of Corporate Communi-
cations: The Impact of Nike v. Kasky, BAKER MEDIA REPORT 3 (July 2003),
http://www.bakerlaw.com/files/tbl s47Details/FileUpload265/16/july%202003%20online.pdf
(last visited May 3, 2004).
264 Id.
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tist who disagrees with the company's characterizations sues
the company for false advertising.
As fate had it, the hypothetical world soon became real, as
evidenced by a suit brought by People for the Ethical Treatment of
Animals (PETA) against Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC) several
months after Nike was handed down. PETA took KFC to court for
allegedly making false statements on its website concerning its
treatment of chickens.266 The suit was dropped when KFC agreed
to amend various statements on its website.267 Notably, anti-
corporate activist groups have not been the only entities to appre-
ciate the potential impact of such litigation. Consider, for exam-
ple, the suit filed by the giant Monsanto against a small dairy con-
cerning statements on the dairy's milk labels related to the use of
hormones in milk.268
Do such prospects, real and hypothetical, signal the impermis-
sible abridgement of corporate speech, or do they signal a permis-
sible check on the power of corporations to mislead or deceive the
public? How that question is answered depends entirely on one's
view of commercial speech-what it is, why we value it, and
whether it should be restricted in order to safeguard the public
welfare. Such inquiries are the topics of the contributions to this
Symposium, which we next ponder.
III. CONCEPTUALIZING COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Make no mistake, the Justices have long struggled with how
to conceptualize commercial speech under the First Amendment.
Between 1942 and 2002, the Court rendered some forty-two com-
mercial speech opinions269 involving approximately thirty catego-
26 5 Id.
266 Elizabeth Becker, Animal Rights Group to Sue Fast-Food Chain, N.Y. TIMES, July 7,
2003, at Al1.
267 Elizabeth Becker, Rights Group for Animals Drops Lawsuit Against KFC, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 2, 2003, at A19.
268 
See David Barboza, Monsanto Sues Dairy in Maine over Label's Remarks on Hor-
mones, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2003, at Cl; J.M. Lawrence, Monsanto Sour on Milk Marketer's
Hormones Claim, BOSTON HERALD, July 4, 2003, at 10, LEXIS, News & Business, News, By
Individual Publication, B, Boston Herald.
269 The Court did not render any commercial speech opinions in the 2003-2004 Term. The
Supreme Court cases that include a commercial speech component are: Thompson v. W. States
Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001); United
States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001); L.A. Police Dep't v. United Reporting Publ'g
Corp., 528 U.S. 32 (1999); Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173
(1999); Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v.
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995); Fla. Bar
v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995); Ibanez v. Fla. Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l Regulation, 512
U.S. 136 (1994); United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993); Edenfield v. Fane, 507
U.S. 761 (1993); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993); Peel v.
[Vol. 54:4
THE LANDMARK FREE-SPEECH CASE THAT WASN'T
ries of expression, 27 ranging from contraceptive 271 and abortion
272
advertising to alcohol 273 and tobacco 274 advertising; from hand-
bills275 to billboards; 276 from optometrist 277 to attorney 278 advertis-
ing; and from election 279 to electric utility 280 advertising. And
cases continue to be accepted as the commercial speech doctrine,
with all its ramifications, expands in a variety of directions.
Assuredly, the Court's sympathy to this line of cases invites
yet more litigation, and that litigation invites the Court to recon-
sider why it should or should not protect such expression as it ven-
tures into new areas. For example, is commercial expression pro-
tected primarily because it provides truthful consumer information
necessary to informed decisions in the marketplace? 28' By the
Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91 (1990); Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S.
469 (1989); Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988); S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S.
Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987); Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478
U.S. 328 (1986); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986); Zauderer v.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985); City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent,
466 U.S. 789 (1984); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983); Viii. of Hoff-
man Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191
(1982); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 530 (1980); Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980);
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978);
In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Carey v.
Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willing-
boro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pitts-
burgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973); Cammarano v. United States, 358
U.S. 498 (1959); Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Donaldson v. Read Maga-
zine Inc., 333 U.S. 178 (1948); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Valentine v.
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
270 These categories are listed on the First Amendment Center's website, at
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/faclibrary/libraryexpression.aspx?topic=commercial-spee
ch&subheading=y (last visited May 3, 2004).
271 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983); Carey v. Population Servs.
Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
272 Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
27344 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.,
514 U.S. 476 (1995).274 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
275 Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
276 Lorillard, 533 U.S. 525; Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
277 Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
27 8 Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995); Peel v. Attorney Regulatory & Disci-
plinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91 (1990); Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988); Zauderer
v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982);
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); Bates
v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
279 City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984); Cammarano v. United
States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
2Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n., 475 U.S. 1 (1986); Cent. Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); Consol. Edison Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
281 See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
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same token, is protection to be withheld when such expression
stands to harm consumers? 282  Is there any role for government
paternalism? 2 83  Depending on how those questions are answered,
what exactly is "commercial speech"? How commercial does it
have to be in order to be branded "commercial"? Can commercial
speakers, whoever they are, be compelled to endorse a government
message about their products if they disagree with that message?
284
Is intermediate scrutiny the appropriate standard of review in
commercial speech cases? 285 And, what about "breathing space" in
the commercial context? Does that principle suggest that some
measure of false or misleading information must be tolerated?
286
What made Nike v. Kasky such a potentially exciting case was
that such questions stood to be answered. But, alas, that wisdom
was never forthcoming. Hence, the insights found in the thirty-
four briefs on the merits287 in Nike were never put to good use.
That is, they were never the basis for a Supreme Court First
Amendment ruling. Gladly, some of those arguments have been
revived for publication in this Symposium. The briefs-turned-
748, 766-73 (1976) (holding that a state may not impose professional standards on pharmacists
by keeping the public ignorant as to the terms that competing pharmacists are offering).
282 See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 624-35 (1995) (holding that a ban
on solicitation of accident victims for 30 days after an accident withstands First Amendment
scrutiny because it fosters the welfare of accident victims).
283 Compare Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328 (1986) (ban-
ning casino gambling advertisements targeted at residents, while not banning those directed at
tourists, constitutionally promoted Puerto Rico's substantial interest in insulating residents from
concerns regarding casino gambling), with 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484
(1996) (banning price advertising of liquor did not advance state's interest in promoting temper-
ance).
284 Compare Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997) (upholding
state regulation that fruit growers help finance generic advertising of fruits, while ruling that
growers' disagreement with the content of the advertising had no bearing on the validity of the
regulation), with United States v. United States Foods, 533 U.S. 405 (2001) (holding that the
First Amendment may prevent the government from compelling individuals to pay subsidies for
speech to which they object).
285 Compare Cen. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980)
(holding that a limitation of commercial speech must directly advance the state interest in-
volved, and it may not be sustained if the interest could be served as well by a more limited
restriction), with Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 571 (2001) (Kennedy, J., con-
curring) (expressing disagreement with the standard set in Central Hudson because it provides
insufficient protection to truthful, non-misleading speech), and 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island, 517 U.S. 484, 518 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that a government's interest
in keeping legal users of products ignorant in order to manipulate consumer choices is per se
illegitimate regulation).
286 Compare N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964) (speech on matters of
public concern needs "breathing space"-potentially incorporating certain false or misleading
speech-in order to survive), with Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 534
(1980) (regarding right in commercial speech cases to "discuss publicly and truthfully all mat-
ters of public concern").
287 See Nike v. Kasky, 123 S.Ct. 2554, 2560 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (referring to briefs
submitted). The briefs appear in electronic form on the First Amendment Center's website, at
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.orglfaclibrary/case.aspx?case=Nike-vKasky.
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articles, 288 together with their companion articles289 here, provide a
fuller measure of analysis by which to consider the functions and
future of the commercial speech doctrine. To put those articles
into bold relief, however, we first explore the principles and per-
spectives at tension in the Nike controversy.
A. Two Principles
Nike wants customers not simply to buy its goods but to be-
lieve in Nike; not only to assess the quality of the products
but to believe in the "motivations" of the producers.
-- Benjamin R. Barber 290
Commerce is linked to communication. Without reliable and
trustworthy communications, commerce as we know it, from sim-
ple two-party contracts to multinational and multilateral dealings,
would be impossible. People and companies rely on truthful trans-
actions, business dealings free of false or misleading statements.
This basic precept suggests one obvious reason why we allow the
government to police transactions: to prevent harm to the parties.
Consumer protection laws were devised, in part, to diminish such
harm to purchasers of products and services by buttressing con-
sumer rights beyond the constraints of private contract law. In
other words, mass transactions might then be regulated in situa-
tions where the harm was otherwise too inconsequential to a par-
ticular consumer to make it worth his or her while to litigate by
way of contractual remedies. Consumer protection statutes, in-
cluding unfair business practice laws, safeguard consumer dealings
by allowing a mass remedy for a mass wrong. Still, the operating
premise is that some consumer or class of consumers has been in-
288 See Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, What Is Commercial Speech? The Issue Not
Decided in Nike v. Kasky, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1143 (2004) (adapting amicus brief sub-
mitted in the U.S. Supreme Court on behalf of members of the United States Congress); Bruce
E.H. Johnson & Jeffrey L. Fisher, Why Format, Not Content, Is the Key to Identifying Commer-
cial Speech, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1243 (2004) (adapting amicus brief submitted in the U.S.
Supreme Court on behalf of forty leading media corporations and media-related trade and pro-
fessional associations); La Fetra, supra note 64, (adapting amicus briefs filed in both the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court on behalf of the Pacific Legal Foundation);
Morrison, supra note 63 (counsel-of-record for amicus brief filed in the U.S. Supreme Court on
behalf of Public Citizen Litigation Group, although article is not adapted from brief); O'Neil,
supra note 64, (adapting amicus brief in the U.S. Supreme Court on behalf of The Thomas
Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression); Vladeck, supra note 64, (adapting from
amicus brief in the U.S. Supreme Court on behalf of Public Citizen Litigation Group).
289 C. Edwin Baker, Paternalism, Politics, and Citizen Freedom: The Commercial Speech
Quandry in Nike, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1161 (2004); Weinstein, supra note 64.
290 BENJAMIN R. BARBER, JIHAD VS. MCWORLD 67 (1995).
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jured in some commercial way that we as a society deem meaning-
ful.
In the tumble of communications from sellers to consumers,
not all communications are held to exacting standards enforceable
under law. For example, even the old common law did not hold
sellers strictly liable if their representations to consumers
amounted to puffery. And not all expectations based on represen-
tations had to be honored at common law if such expectations were
commercially unreasonable.291 Within such general boundaries,
then, the harm principle operates in both contract 292 and consumer
protection law.
Absent any harm to consumers, there is little, if any, justifica-
tion for regulating the communications of sellers. Moreover, there
is good reason to extend First Amendment protection to such
communications-provided, of course, one believes corporations
should have constitutional rights at all. That, we submit, is the
operative logic of Virginia Pharmacy and its conceptually faithful
progeny. The harm principle is the primary, if not determinative,
reason why false statements do not receive constitutional protec-
tion in the commercial setting. If such communications involve
matters beyond the boundaries of a specific transaction, they cause
either no harm or no material harm to consumers as consumers and
are, therefore, at least candidates for speech that might be charac-
terized as political. In this realm, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
teaches us there is either no harm or whatever harm that may befall
citizens stands to be remedied by the free exchange of opinions in
the marketplace.
The controversy that occasions this Symposium is one that
can be considered and charted between two principles: the harm
principle and the free-speech principle. The free-speech rights of
sellers diminish proportionally depending on how direct, immedi-
ate, and substantial the harm is to consumers. By the same ana-
lytical token, when such harm is not readily discernible, the free-
speech rights of sellers increase.
Against that backdrop, consider Nike v. Kasky. Two points
are especially significant in attempting to reach some measure of
clarity here. Consider, first, the changing nature of commercial
transactions in America, and second, the nature of the allegations
291 See Jacobs & Young v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 890-91 (N.Y. 1921) (ruling that use of
Cohoes piping, although contract expressly called for Reading piping, was trivial in relation to
the substantial costs to replace piping).
292 
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 162 (1981) ("When a Misrepresentation
is Fraudulent or Material").
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made by Marc Kasky when he filed his consumer complaint
against Nike.
1. Changing Nature of Consumer Transactions
The cultural history of commercial speech is largely the story
of a general movement from product-information to image and
lifestyle advertising.293 What was once a utilitarian vehicle for
informing the consumer about an item's price and characteristics
has now become more a personality profile for a company and its
products. We buy Nike shoes as much for their symbolic swoosh
as for their composition and construction. We buy Ben & Jerry's
ice cream not just because it's creamy (and caloric) but because
the company has a social conscience-it gives "1% for peace. 294
We shop at Eileen Fisher clothing stores not only because of fash-
ionable garb, but also because of fashionable political statements
(e.g., "Rape Free Zone") on "V-Day" banners across their display
windows.295
This development has reconfigured transactions in the mar-
ketplace of items and ideas, at least as a matter of cultural reality if
not legal reasoning. At bottom, it invites us, as citizens, consum-
ers, activists, lawyers, judges, and scholars, to ask: What exactly is
it that we are buying? What is the consideration that is being ex-
changed: dollars for shoes, for corporate image, or for both?
These are crucial inquiries; after all, the character of a trans-
action determines the nature of private or public harm suffered
when the transaction fails. That is, if consumers buy no more than
rubber and air cushions in a Nike shoe, then their harm is limited
to defects in those product qualities. By contrast, if consumers
"buy" Michael Jordan's athletic agility and sports celebrity, then
can they ever be harmed if their expectations are not realized?
293This point, among others, was developed in RONALD K.L. COLLINS & DAVID M.
SKOVER, DEATH OF DISCOURSE 67-135 (1996). Unfortunately, some of our critics on both the
Left and Right failed to appreciate our mission and our satire in that work. Our study of the link
between commerce and communication, for example, was less concerned with normative con-
clusions than with cultural analysis; less concerned with providing answers than raising ques-
tions; and less concerned with free-speech results than with First Amendment rationales. This
Foreword, in contrast, is more pointedly directed to conclusions, though we retain the preroga-
tive to revise our observations one day if that becomes necessary.
294 
See Simon Balint et al., Ben & Jerry-A Case Study, Ex. 3 ("Ben & Jerry's brings to-
gether 400 companies to support the '1% for Peace' campaign advocating redirection of military
spending towards public health, education, and poverty."), at http://www.geocities.com/dsouzsj/
ben.and.jerry-casestudy.htm (last visited May 3, 2004).
295 Eileen Fisher is one among other companies, such as Liz Claiborne and Tampax, that
sponsor V-Day, a global movement to stop violence against women. See V-Day, V-Day: Spon-
sors & Supporters, at http://www.vday.org/contents/victory/sponsors (last visited May 3, 2004).
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Then again, if consumers buy Nike shoes tagged with a union bug,
are they harmed should that representation prove false?
Traditional breach-of-contract analysis would recognize a
wrong and a corresponding remedy in the first situation. The sec-
ond scenario might be dismissed as no more than corporate puff-
ery. And the third situation seems better suited for analysis under
consumer protection and unfair business practices laws. We plan
to say more about all of this shortly, but for now we wish to pro-
ceed to our second point.
2. The Peculiar Character of Kasky's Consumer Complaint
The legal posture of Nike v. Kasky is so unusual that it smacks
of an idea born in the brain of a devilish Socratic-minded law pro-
fessor. Recall that Marc Kasky alleged no harm to either himself
or the public.296 What he did allege was that Nike had negligently
made false statements. In effect, then, this private attorney general
was using the force of the law to compel Nike to tell the truth re-
gardless of a charge, let alone proof, of any injury. Apparently
authorized by the peculiarities of California's unfair business prac-
tices law, Kasky used the State's courts as "truth commissions" to
interrogate and punish Nike. In this respect, he wished to take the
dispute about Southeast Asian sweatshops out of the court of pub-
lic opinion and into the court of law. What was once a matter of
public debate became a matter of private litigation.
B. Running with Nike (or How Are We Injured?)
We trust that there are certain kinds of corporate misrepresen-
tations that are immune from any kind of First Amendment protec-
tion, even in the eyes of the most stalwart libertarian. Consider the
following examples:
* Nike advertises in newspapers that a particular pair of
shoes costs $15, when in fact they cost $50.
* Nike advertises on radio that its shoes have reinforced
arches, when in fact they do not.
* Nike advertises on television that its shoe tops are
made of "100% leather," when in reality they are made
of simulated leather.
Assume, in all three scenarios, that consumers who purchased
the products relied upon those corporate assurances. Such exam-
ples are blatant illustrations of actionable misrepresentations, and
contract law would have little difficulty in finding material
2
19See supra Part I.B.
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breaches. It would be ludicrous, we postulate, to craft any New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan defense to protect the corporations
against liability for these falsehoods. That being said, liability
would typically depend on some allegation of injury to a pur-
chaser, although that would be easy to do here. In this context, the
harm principle readily trumps the free-speech principle.
By contrast, there are certain kinds of corporate misrepresen-
tations that would be beyond the pale of government regulation.
Consider the following examples:
* Nike advertises in newspapers: "Save an Endangered
Species-Yourself."
* Nike advertises on radio that any kid who wants to
"be like Mike" should buy its shoes.
* Nike advertises on television that "Nike has the
blessings of the Greek gods."
These situations are obvious instances of non-actionable mis-
representations. Certainly, contract law would consider all of them
to be puffery at best and illusory at worst. It would be preposter-
ous to posit any meaningful consumer harm, as the First Amend-
ment would unquestionably protect Nike's exaggerations. The law
obviously allows such imaginative artistry, whether in noncom-
mercial or commercial speech. In this context, the free-speech
principle readily trumps the harm principle.
But what about the gray area, the world of mixed messages
where the line between product information and corporate puffery
is not easily demarcated? Moreover, since a corporation is a mar-
ket player, how can it ever make political statements that are not
automatically characterized as commercial? Consider the follow-
ing examples:
* At a "V-Day" 297 press conference, Nike announces
that it has joined the corporate sponsors of the vio-
lence-against-women campaign, which is a common
practice likely to improve a corporation's public im-
age. Later, an anti-corporate activist group charges
that Nike knowingly tolerates abuses against women
in its foreign factories.
* Phil Knight, Nike's CEO, appears on Larry King
Live and, in response to a question about corporate
responsibility and the environment, says "our com-
pany is committed to being 'Green."' An investiga-
297 See supra note 295.
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tive reporter later reveals that a Nike plant in Taiwan
has polluted the local water supply.
298
" Same facts as in the actual Nike case, before litiga-
tion. This time, however, the company's representa-
tions as to its working conditions in foreign factories
are made at a stockholders' meeting.29
* Same facts as in the actual Nike case, before litiga-
tion. This time, however, the company's representa-
tions as to its working conditions in foreign factories
are made to college coaches who had informed Nike
that they would no longer purchase its products ab-
sent clear assurances that the workers were neither
underpaid nor physically abused.
How do we get a conceptual hold on these hypotheticals? In these
circumstances, what constitutes harm and what qualifies as pro-
tected speech?
For Marc Kasky and his lawyers, the answer is straightfor-
ward: All are actionable under the California law because harm
needs not be alleged or proven. It is enough to assert baldly that
the company misrepresented verifiable facts within its knowledge
and control, whether done accidentally, recklessly, or willfully. In
fact, it might be legally sufficient to demonstrate no more than that
the statements were false.
For Professor C. Edwin Baker,3°° the answer is equally
straightforward: All are actionable, under any state or federal con-
sumer protection law, because for-profit corporations, other than
those in the media, 30 1 are not entitled to First Amendment protec-
298 Would the result in the hypothetical be any different if, after the investigative report,
Mr. Knight made the same general statement? Or what if he made the statement with specific
reference to the Nike plant in Taiwan that was the topic of the newspaper report?
299To give credit where it is due, this hypothetical came from Professor David Vladeck.
On February 10, 2003, Vladeck sprung that hypothetical on Walter Dellinger, one of Nike's
Supreme Court counsels, during a debate sponsored by the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York. David Vladeck, Comments before the First Amendment Section of the Bar of the
Association of the City of New York (Feb. 10, 2003) (on file with authors).
350 Baker, supra note 289. Baker's theory of free speech, ostensibly grounded in his notion
of self-realization, is one rooted more in the liberty of socialism than of capitalism. That helps
to explain his understanding of self-realization and his animosity towards protections for corpo-
rate speech. His theory, in that sense, is on a collision course with the capitalism of contempo-
rary American culture and the legal system that makes that culture possible. Compare COLLINS
& SKOVER, supra note 293, at 104-05, 154-55. In other words, the American commercial cul-
ture's values are not his values; its free-speech principles are not his; and its notion of imper-
missible censorship is not his. What this means is that when applied to our world, his theory
seems extreme. This is not to say, however, that it should not be entertained, if only in the name
of defending robust dissent. By that measure, Professor Baker gives some quantum of intellec-
tual staying power to the anti-corporate forces that hoped to gag the mighty Nike.
301 Professor Baker's self-realization principle is inapplicable to for-profit corporations,
other than for-profit corporations that trade in speech. Hence, speech by the press or media is to
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302 otewrtion. In other words, liability turns categorically on the identity
of the speaker, not the content or the context of the speech.
Professors Erwin Chemerinsky and Catherine Fisk30 3 would,
we gather, reach the same result on all four hypotheticals as does
Professor Baker, though by a different analytical route. For them,
corporate speech can be entitled to First Amendment protection.
But in Nike, as in the four scenarios, the Bolger test,3°4 correctly
applied, defeats all First Amendment claims. 30 5  "Consumers who
are misled about which companies to patronize suffer a commer-
cial harm within the meaning of this Court's precedents,'3°6 argue
Chemerinsky and Fisk.
The First Amendment should grant no less protection to con-
sumers who avoid beef produced under certain conditions for
fear of 'mad cow' disease than those who avoid beef out of
be protected, and the profit motive of such creations of the state is to be ignored. Such distinc-
tions, of course, could not be justified based on an audience's right to self-realize by way of the
information such individuals receive. If it did, it would be pointless to distinguish between
corporate (profit, non-profit, or press) and non-corporate speakers. Precisely this point is made
forcefully by Professor Redish. See MARTIN H. REDISH, MONEY TALK$: SPEECH, ECONOMIC
POWER, AND THE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY 65, 71-80 (2001). Where the speaker is the mes-
sage, the message content becomes irrelevant. For if the same message content were delivered
by a media corporation and a non-media for-profit corporation, it would obtain constitutional
and personal value in the case of the former but not in that of the latter. Moreover, a good ar-
gument can be made that the modern electronic media actually undermine traditional notions of
free speech and self-realization. See COLLINS & SKOVER, supra note 293. Professor Baker's
views notwithstanding, it should be noted that progressives have long challenged the idea that
the corporate press somehow stands in special shoes as a legal entity entitled to constitutional
protection as if it were akin to a real person for First Amendment purposes. See OUR UNFREE
PRESS: 100 YEARS OF RADICAL MEDIA CRITICISM 8-9, 305-19, 365-67, 377-86 (Robert W.
McChesney & Ben Scott eds., 2004). See generally RONALD COLLINS, DICTATING CONTENT:
How ADVERTISING PRESSURE CAN CORRUPT A FREE PRESS (Center for the Study of Commer-
cialism 1992).
m It bears recalling that Kasky's suit was brought not only against Nike, Inc., but also
against individuals. As the California Supreme Court put it: "The individual defendants (Philip
Knight, Thomas Clarke, Mark Parker, Stephen Gomez, and David Taylor) are officers and/or
directors of Nike." Kasky v. Nike, Inc. 45 P.3d 243, 247 (Cal. 2002). How, we wonder, does
this affect the application of Professor Baker's theory of commercial speech? Would it allow
for First Amendment protection for these five individuals, assuming that some or all of them
had some connection to the statements that gave rise to this litigation? If so, would it permit the
very same statements to be actionable against the company but not the company's executive
officers and directors? In this regard, consider the questions posed to Professor Baker by Deb-
orah La Fetra in her contribution to this Symposium. See La Fetra, supra note 64, at 1222.
303 Chemerinsky & Fisk, supra note 288.
3w Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983) (distinguishing com-
mercial speech from non-commercial speech by three characteristics: (1) whether the communi-
cation is an advertisement; (2) whether it concerns a product; and (3) whether the speaker has an
economic motivation).
305 Because Chemerinsky and Fisk's amicus brief in the Supreme Court argued against
Nike's First Amendment claims, it is apparent that the stockholders' meeting and the college
coaches scenarios, based as they are on the background facts in the Nike case, would likely add
nothing to save Nike.
306 Chemerinsky & Fisk, supra note 288, at 1151.
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concerns for the welfare of cows or of those who raise and
slaughter them .... Their motives for buying or eschewing
products are irrelevant; false factual statements that might in-
fluence their buying are commercial harms and they are well
within the power of states to regulate.3 °7
Importantly, Chemerinsky and Fisk consider the format of expres-
sion-paid advertisements vs. letters to newspapers-to be irrele-
vant in distinguishing commercial speech. 8
By contrast, for Bruce Johnson and Jeffrey Fisher, format is
"the key to identifying commercial speech '' 309 entitled to less First
Amendment protection. With neo-McLuhanite attention to the na-
ture of a medium rather than the content of a message, 310 they ar-
gue that corporate speech is commercial when it occurs "in direct
proximity to consumers' purchasing decisions, e.g., speech that
proposes a commercial transaction on a product label, advertise-
ment, or similar format., 311 In contrast, "speech offered in a pub-
lic debate regarding a company's corporate citizenship or other-
wise at least one step removed from actual purchasing decisions"
should be accorded full First Amendment protection.3 2
The rationale for such a format-based distinction is that "as-
sertions about products and services that are made in the commer-
cial marketplace rarely afford consumers significant time or ability
to scrutinize their truthfulness,, 31 3 and may not as likely be vetted
by media inquiries during the kind of "fast-developing public de-
bate" that existed in Nike.3 14 Given this rationale, we surmise that
Johnson and Fisher's answers to the four hypotheticals would go in
exactly the opposite direction of Kasky, Baker, Chemerinsky and
Fisk. Johnson and Fisher surely would extend full First Amend-
ment protection in the "V-Day" and "being Green" cases. And,
arguably, they would not treat either the stockholders' meeting
scenario or the college coach example any differently. In both
situations, Nike's misrepresentations are not made in a direct ad-
vertising format,315 and appear to be "one step removed" from ac-
307 Id. at 1152.
308Id. at 1154.
309 Johnson & Fisher, supra note 288, at 1243.31oWe refer here to Marshall McLuhan's famous aphorism, "the medium is the message,"
whereby he indicated that a medium's technological attributes should be the focus of study
rather than the content of the messages transmitted by that medium. See MARSHALL MCLUHAN,
UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSION OF MAN 7-21 (MIT Press ed., 1994).
31 Johnson & Fisher, supra note 288, at 1245.
312 Id.
3 13 Id. at 1250.
31
4 Id. at 1252.
315 Of course, this may beg the question since more and more commercial advertising is
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tual decisions to buy stock or shoes.316 Additionally, since the hy-
potheticals assume the same background facts as in the Nike con-
troversy prior to litigation, the misrepresentations are caught up in
the swirl of intense media coverage over the veracity of the com-
pany's claims.
As we read Deborah La Fetra's article, she may well accord
with Johnson and Fisher's results for the four hypotheticals, but
for content-based, not format-based, reasons.317 The libertarian La
Fetra values the content of corporate speech for the diversity that it
adds to public debates: "Corporate speech counteracts the domi-
nance of the few media megacorporations, and of government offi-
cials who can command free access to the press and other means of
disseminating information merely by virtue of their position."
318
Moreover, she appreciates that our contemporary speech culture is
a tossed salad of the political and the profitable. With product
placements, 319  sponsorships, 320  testimonials, 321  virtual advertis-
ing,32 2 guerrilla marketing, 32 3 and corporate image advertising,
324
the line between commercial and non-commercial speech has
blurred almost beyond recognition.
For La Fetra, a vibrant First Amendment demands full consti-
tutional protection of all corporate expression, except that which
can be regulated by narrow consumer fraud statutes. "The critical
point," she explains, "is that while the seller is free to make true,
not made in a direct advertising format. By that standard, much of what is understood as adver-
tising would be tantamount to political speech or some other type of similarly protected expres-
sion.
316 We are unsure as to how Johnson and Fisher would apply the "one step removed" ele-
ment of their analysis to the college coaches' hypothetical. On the one hand, Nike's statement
could be characterized as a condition precedent to the university's obligations to buy the com-
pany's shoes, in which case harm would be seen as immediately flowing from Nike's alleged
misrepresentations. On the other hand, consider the impact here of Johnson and Fisher's analy-
sis: "When the media provide consumers with informative counterspeech regarding a com-
pany's business practices, and consumers have ample time to reflect on that information, should
the government nevertheless be allowed to punish companies for making potentially misleading
assertions to the press in the course of this coverage?" Id. at 1249. Should there be substantial
time for reflection between Nike's assurances to the coaches and the university's decisions to
buy shoes, we ask in turn, would the "contemporaneous and easily accessible press coverage"
that characterized the Nike case itself satisfy Johnson and Fisher's analysis for First Amendment
protection? Id.
317 La Fetra, supra note 64.
318 Id. at 1222 (citations omitted).
319 Id. at 1231 (commercials in film, television, and even novels).320 Id. at 1232(underwriting of shows, concerts, or sports events).
321 Id. (celebrity narratives to tout products overtly or subtly).
322 Id. at 1234 (computer-generated commercial images inserted in live broadcasts).
323 Id. (corporate-paid actors promote products in the public arena without the audience's
awareness).324 Id. at 1237 (projecting the company's political and social identity or making statements
on important public issues).
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false, or misleading claims, he will be liable if buyers rely on those
claims to make purchases. 325 We wonder whether, given her con-
sumer fraud exception, La Fetra might agonize a bit over the
stockholders' meeting and college coach scenarios. Are they regu-
lated cases of buyer reliance on false claims to make purchases?
Or, considering her core belief in the capability of consumers "to
separate the wheat from the chaff' 326 in public debates over sig-
nificant social issues, would La Fetra be more likely to analyze
those two scenarios along the lines of Johnson and Fisher's ration-
ales as we have presented them?
For Professor Robert O'Neil,327 the touchstone for analysis,
beyond other considerations, is "the message's impact upon [the]
audience. 328 In that respect, context is crucial. More specifically,
O'Neil holds, we are to determine how a particular corporate
statement affects a consumer's "immediate judgment whether or
not to buy the product or service. 329 If the "potential value of the
message" goes beyond that immediate judgment,330 "the fact that a
consumer may be favorably (or unfavorably) disposed to buy on
the basis of such information should not, by itself, cause the mes-
sage to be classified as commercial speech. ' 331 Let us try our phi-
losophic best to apply this formula to our scenarios.
It is safe to speculate that O'Neil, like Johnson and Fisher and
La Fetra, would grant full First Amendment protection to the "V-
Day" and the "being Green" scenarios, because the speech in ques-
tion is far removed "from any immediate or specific sales pitch. 332
Surely, equally uncomplicated for O'Neil is the college coach sce-
nario; we assume that he would deem the communications to be
constitutionally unprotected given the speaker, context, and imme-
diate impact on the audience. The stockholders' meeting example
strikes us as somewhat more challenging for him. On the one
hand, O'Neil contends that when the same statements were made
in the Nike case, they amounted to protected expression. On the
other hand, would the stockholder audience and meeting context
be enough to change his conclusion? Any misrepresentations, af-
ter all, are likely to have an impact upon that audience's decisions
as to retaining or selling the company's stock. If the stockholders
32
5 Id. at 1241.
326 Id. at 1223.
327 O'Neil, supra note 64.32
81d. at 1272.
329 d. at 1273 (emphasis added).
330Id. at 1272.
331 Id. at 1272-73 (emphasis added).
3321d. at 1273.
[Vol. 54:4
THE LANDMARK FREE-SPEECH CASE THAT WASN'T
rely on such statements, they do so to their economic detriment.
Are the statements, then, comparable to the "immediate or specific
sales pitch to which a commercial speech classification appropri-
ately follows?
333
Professor David Vladeck,334 ever the highly able and dedi-
cated consumer-interest advocate, cannot countenance the possibil-
ity that the logic of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, or the logic of
the Supreme Court's commercial speech doctrine, should be ex-
tended to immunize false statements of the kind alleged in Nike.
At the outset, he views New York Times as a weapon in the arsenal
of the powerless, and not a cannon for corporations. 335 And he un-
derstands hostility to false commercial speech to be the essential
thread running through the entire line of commercial speech cases
from Virginia Pharmacy onward.336 In the fighting spirit of the
public-citizen activist, Vladeck scoffs at the idea that the "playing
field" of public debate has to be leveled in the interests of a mega-
corporation like Nike, "a company worth $20 billion, [that has]
ample resources to ensure that its voice is heard. 3 37 Nonetheless,
he appreciates the value of commercial speech to inform consum-
ers and is willing to extend the protections of that doctrine to cor-
porate speakers, albeit grudgingly.
Accordingly, should Vladeck be asked to represent consumer
interests in our four hypotheticals, 338 we presume that he would
find only the "being Green" scenario a candidate for free speech
protection, if only because Phil Knight's statement is arguably not
specific enough to trigger any real consumer reliance. Professor
Vladeck is comfortable with the adversarial relationship between
activists and corporate America. As a public-interest advocate, he
33 3 
Id.
334 See Vladeck, supra note 64. Since Alan Morrison's article in this Symposium is largely
historical, and since he was the lead counsel in the Public Citizen's amicus brief to the Supreme
Court signed by Vladeck, we presume that Vladeck's reasoning and results as to the four by-
potheticals would be endorsed by Morrison.
335 Vladeck argues:
Indeed, Nike's argument stands the rationale for New York Times on its head. The
Court forged the New York Times standard to empower ordinary members of the
public, who do not have ready access to the media or deep pockets to gain access to
the media, to engage and criticize public officials, public figures, and powerful insti-
tutions, like the Nike Corporation. The Court assumed that the rich and powerful
have ample means to make sure their voices are heard.
Id. at 1076.
336 
See id. at 1076.
337 Id. at 1076, 1077.
338 As Professor Vladeck submitted an amicus brief in the Supreme Court arguing against
Nike's First Amendment claims, it is clear that for him, as for Chemerinsky and Fisk, the stock-
holders' meeting and the college coaches scenarios, based as they are on the background facts in
the Nike case, would likely add nothing to save Nike. See supra notes 149-15 1.
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is willing to sue and be sued without the First Amendment always
keeping Nikes or Naders out of the courtroom.
Professor James Weinstein's perspective shares aspects of the
views held by other contributors to this Symposium, but ultimately
his outlook on Nike is different than all of them. 339 Agreeing with
Baker, Weinstein opines that "ordinary business entities such as
Nike are not the ultimate sovereigns in a democratic society, nor
are they entities in need of the legitimizing function of free
speech." 34 However, Weinstein parts company with Baker in ac-
cording some First Amendment protection to corporate speech for
instrumentalist reasons: particularly, to ensure information needed
by individuals for democratic decision-making. 34' Likewise, while
acknowledging the relevancy of the kind of format analysis per-
formed by Johnson and Fisher, Weinstein distances himself from
them as well: "[I]t would, I believe, be a mistake to give decisive
weight to the presumption that [Nike's] speech is public discourse
just because it utilizes media essential to that dialogue." 342 And
although sharing La Fetra's objections to California's overbroad
false-advertising regime, insofar as it facially prohibits literally
true statements that mislead or deceive consumers and requires no
finding that anyone was actually harmed,343 Weinstein will not join
her in adopting the "extremely strong protection .. .provided by
the New York Times 'malice' standard.
344
The Arizona State University law professor strikes out, in the
end, on his own path of more moderate protection for corporate
speech, the type accorded in defamation suits under the Gertz v.
Welch standard.345 To prevent consumer protection laws from
chilling true commercial speech in a viewpoint-discriminatory
manner, the First Amendment should require, at least as to speech
on matters of public concern, that a private plaintiff allege and
prove: (i) the corporate speaker's negligence in making false
statements; (ii) actual reliance on those statements; and (iii) actual
damages.34  On that basis, we venture that Professor Weinstein
would have but one answer to all of our four hypotheticals: They
339 Weinstein, supra note 64.
30Id. at 1116.





45418 U.S. 323, 348-49 (1974) (holding that the First Amendment forbids imposition of
liability, in a defamation suit brought by a private person, regarding false statements on a matter
of public concern without proof of negligence and actual damages).
34
6 Weinstein, supra note 64, at 1140-41.
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are not factually nuanced enough to make a reasoned judgment on
how they would fall under the Gertz standard. If we were suffi-
ciently rash to guess what Weinstein would say on his most First
Amendment-friendly days, we might conjecture that he would split
the difference down the middle: detrimental reliance and actual
harm are likely to doom Nike's First Amendment defenses in the
stockholders' meeting and college coaches scenarios, but less
likely to do so in the "V-Day" and "being Green" situations.
All of this is only our assessment of the articles that you are
about to read. We may have, unintentionally of course, made a
few misrepresentations of our own. If so, we throw ourselves on
the mercy of you, our readers, our Symposium colleagues, and the
palliative force of the First Amendment, if it comes to that. Ulti-
mately, our best defense is that our informed readers are best
suited to ferret out the truth.
What, then, about our own reactions to the four scenarios?
Before proceeding directly to our answers, we think it wise to first
enter a few comments and admissions into the record. As we have
said, Nike's actions are difficult to gauge in First Amendment
terms because in modern America, the enterprise of marketing has
moved significantly away from product-information advertising to
messages enhancing product images and corporate identity. In this
tumbling of commerce and communication, we are, to borrow
from Madonna, "living in a material world., 347 Our entire culture
has been commercialized. As a result, it is difficult to determine
exactly what one is buying, exactly when a communication is
false, or exactly when one has suffered a legal harm. It is also in-
creasingly difficult to separate the wheat of political expression
from the chaff of commercial expression. 348 We think, as we wrote
in The Death of Discourse, that this has consequences for the law.
347 Madonna, Material Girl, on LIKE A VIRGIN (Sire 1984).
348 Judge Alex Kozinski and Professor Stuart Banner have written thoughtfully on this very
point. See Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L.
REV. 627, 628-29 (1990) (analyzing the judicial distinction between commercial and non-
commercial speech during the latter half of the twentieth century). Given that insight, we for-
give these two fine gentlemen for mischaracterizing our views, without malice-no doubt-as
they just do not get our satire. See Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The Anti-History and Pre-
History of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 747, 748-49 (1993) (providing parallel analysis
of First Amendment jurisprudence and suggesting that our analysis is anti-historical). Our ini-
tial response is set out in Ronald Collins & David Skover, The Psychology of First Amendment
Scholarship: A Reply, 71 TEX. L. REV. 819, 829 (1993) (rebutting the charges of anti-
historicism).
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If we lean more towards encouraging expression and less to-
wards endorsing regulation, it is because of the fear that in a
highly commercial culture we cannot "get" them, those corporate
"liars," without, at the same time, undermining much of what we
value in modern America. Moreover, we have a certain faith in the
"Fourth Estate" to help purify some of the pollution that corporate
speakers pour into our culture by way of false or misleading mes-
sages. Granted, we cannot expect the press always to be as vigi-
lant and hard-hitting as it was in the Nike case. That is one reason
we think it vital for our constitutional law to fortify dissent, as we
suggest below. Doing so might buttress the forces ready and able
to counter, when necessary, corporate falsehoods of the kind al-
leged in Nike.349
By reinforcing the First Amendment, we trust that our society
will be the better for it. Still, like Holmes, we realize that much of
this is, at best, but "an experiment, as all life is an experiment.
Every year if not every day we have to wager our salvation upon
some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge., 350  Indeed.
Mindful of that wager, here are our preliminary thoughts on the
hypotheticals.
The V-Day press conference is a good example of the new
style of corporate communication. Does it signify an innovative
and welcome kind of corporate "consciousness?" Or does it repre-
sent nothing more than a crass attempt to boost corporate image
and thereby increase corporate profits? Or is it both? In the ex-
ample, does the company by its announcement put itself on record
to change its own deplorable practices, or is this no more than an
attempt to cover-up a brutal truth? This kind of statement strikes
us as political fare, though we grant it may have commercial con-
sequences. One may, understandably, peg her decision to buy
Nike products based on the truth or falsity of such generalized an-
nouncements. After all, for years many Americans did not pur-
chase iceberg lettuce because agricultural companies allegedly
mistreated migrant farm workers. Clearly, if the companies could
convince them otherwise, that could affect consumer choices.
Part of what troubles us about permitting Marc Kasky to regu-
late such expression is that it virtually denies the possibility of any
corporate speech being characterized as political. On that score,
what Kasky's lawyers wrote in their brief to the U.S. Supreme
349 Perhaps it is prudent to state the obvious: This part of our discussion concerns only cor-
porate communications about its own identity or image advertising. By contrast, false or mis-
leading corporate misrepresentations about the character, quality, or price of a product are obvi-
ously not beyond the pale of needed government regulation.
350 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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Court bears repeating: "It is true that almost anything a company
does or says may have an economic motivation, whether the com-
pany is building a new plant or supporting favorable legislation,
and thus may ultimately serve the purpose of 'promoting sales of
its products.' ', 35' This is, we believe, just another way of saying
that there is no such thing as constitutionally protected corporate
speech. It is Professor Baker's theory woven into the fabric of our
law. Considering our reservations about his theory, we think there
is insufficient evidence in this hypothetical to set aside a First
Amendment defense. Then again, if the facts and the harm more
closely approximated those in the college coaches' hypothetical,
analyzed below, we might reach a different conclusion.
"Being Green" on Larry King has several indicators of a mes-
sage that is more political than commercial. For example, as John-
son and Fisher would note, Phil Knight's comment did not occur in
a traditional advertising format. Furthermore, it is a generalized
statement about corporate sentiments, rather than a particularized
and factually verifiable statement about a product. Moreover,
since the investigative reporter's findings come later, it is hard to
appreciate how Knight's commentary would foster any reasonable
reliance by consumers that might lead to actionable harm. It reso-
nates, for us, with the notion of commercial puffery. Thus, we
would extend First Amendment protection in this hypothetical. To
put ourselves out on a limb, our answer would be the same even if
Knight's statement came after the newspaper report, for reasons
similar to the ones given above for the "V-Day" scenario. In some
respects, our reworking here of the "being Green" hypothetical
reintroduces the Nike case itself.
To be clear, the stockholders' meeting hypothetical assumes
all of the facts in Nike before litigation plus statements made to
stockholders. Were the declarations to stockholders the only
communications that Nike had made about its labor practices, we
would conclude, as we do below for the college coaches scenario,
that the stockholders' detrimental reliance and resulting harm
would be real, reasonable, and substantial enough to permit gov-
ernmental regulation without constitutional impediment. But, as it
is written, the hypo is more challenging for us. On the one hand, if
Nike's statements outside of the meeting room are to be classified
as protected speech, why should they be reclassified, and lose that
protection, simply because they were made inside the meeting
room? On the other hand, Nike's alleged misrepresentations inside
the meeting room arguably are more proximately connected to the
351 Respondent's Brief at 34, Nike (No. 02-575).
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stockholders' transactional decisions and, hence, to their actual
harm. Ultimately, we sign on to Johnson and Fisher's reasoning
for this hypothetical, for it strikes us as implausible that the media
tornado raging around the Nike dispute was not sufficiently force-
ful, indeed ferocious at times, to provide stockholders with ade-
quate counterspeech to curb their reliance on Nike's representa-
tions at the meeting. This is exactly where the rubber hits the road
for those who place their faith in the First Amendment.
For us, the college coach hypothetical must cut in favor of
regulation, given the probable, foreseeable, and cognizable harm
that would surely result from Nike's representations. In other
words, the college coaches' purchases of Nike products are predi-
cated on the company's assurances about working conditions in its
foreign factories. Since the hypothetical very much resembles a
contractual barter, or even a case of detrimental reliance, there
must be a remedy, lest fraud is countenanced. Change the parties,
context, and reliance, and the result could easily be different.
The Nike definitional problem-what exactly is commercial
speech?-will not go away. It is one created by our commercial
culture. So it is inevitable, as if prophesized in a myth, that some
child of Nike will one day come to the high Court. When it does,
will the Justices simply reaffirm the Bolger test or will they recon-
figure it? Or will they draw on the insights offered by one, sev-
eral, or all of the articles in this Symposium to develop a new test?
And when the old test is reaffirmed or reconfigured or rejected,
will they protect corporate expression beyond the borders of Cen-
tral Hudson and toward the horizon of New York Times Co. v. Sul-
livan? Should that come to pass, what will inform the Court's de-
cision to follow the path it does? Mindful of that question, we
proceed to the final section of this Foreword.
IV. TOWARD A MARKETPLACE OF DISSENT
If the first amendment is to have an organizing symbol...
let it be the image of the dissenter.
-- Steven H. Shiffrin
352
For all its PR campaigns, Nike could never dodge the bullets
fired by New York Times columnist Bob Herbert, who devoted nine
352 STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 5 (1990).
Our friend and colleague, Steve Shiffrin, may take exception to some of what is said in this
section of our Foreword. If so, we welcome his dissenting opinion.
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columns to attacking the shoe company's labor practices abroad.353
Here is a sampling of what he said:
* "While the fabulous wealth of men like Philip Knight
and Michael Jordan continues to soar, the pathetic
wages of the workers who make Nike products are
ruthlessly suppressed.
354
* "Nike executives know exactly what is going on in
Indonesia. They are not bothered by the cries of the
oppressed. It suits them. Each cry is a signal that
their investment is paying off.
355
* "Rather than crack down on the abusive conditions in
the factories, Nike has resorted to an elaborate inter-
national public relations campaign to give the ap-
pearance that it cares about the workers. But no
amount of public relations will change the fact that a
full-time worker who makes $1.60 a day is likely to
spend a fair amount of time hungry if three very sim-
ple meals cost $2. lO.,,356
* "The abuses continue, even as Mr. Knight spends un-
told millions trying to show what a good guy he
is.
, ,357
Absent New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,358 such hard-hitting
journalism may have been met by a libel action. Tellingly, though
Nike vigorously refuted Marc Kasky's claims, it never filed a
defamation suit against him. What could not likely be accom-
plished by Nike in the realm of defamation, however, could be
achieved by Kasky in the realm of consumer protection. Given the
California Supreme Court's ruling, the law remains stacked in fa-
vor of anti-corporate speech. Even if one agrees with that critique,
and we are sympathetic to it to a point, can it really be denied that
this scenario smacks of content discrimination? Perhaps activists
take comfort in suppressing a modicum of Nike's communications
because they feel that, in almost every other way, the company's
burgeoning ad budgets drown out their progressive messages. In
essence, government censorship is invoked to rectify, at least to
some degree, what they perceive to be a speech imbalance. But, of
course, that form of tit-for-tat is not a stratagem easily reconciled
with the First Amendment. We cannot censor corporate messages
353 See supra notes 6, 10, and 11.
354 Nike's Pyramid Scheme, supra note 11.
355 Herbert, supra note 10.
356 Brutality in Vietnam, supra note 6.
357 
Nike Blinks, supra note 6.
358 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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without deconstructing the architecture of America's commercial
culture at the same time. For our advanced capitalist society to
endorse such a stratagem would be highly dysfunctional.
This level-the-playing-field approach to First Amendment law
assumes that censorship is vital to a healthy democracy. But are
there other, non-censorial ways to counter the corporate message
machine? Consider again Bob Herbert's pounding rhetoric. PR
can never buy that kind of unrelenting copy. If anything, the
Fourth Estate acted admirably, with a flood of stories, columns,
and editorials, in taking on the corporate Goliath. As Naomi Klein
asserted, "Nike' s sweatshop scandals have been the subject of over
1,500 news articles and opinion columns." 359 That torrent of news
analysis, we posit, more than evened out the verbal playing field in
this case. In fact, one senses that the more that Nike escalated its
PR campaign, the more the press rose to the challenge. And in the
course of it all, millions of Americans came to see Nike in a new
and not so flattering light.
But the Kaskys and ReclaimDemocracy.orgs of America
must, nonetheless, retain an equal right to criticize and condemn
the captains of commerce, those who in their eyes drain people's
life force in the name of profit. If corporations can drape them-
selves in the First Amendment, at least as to true claims about
products and/or questionable claims about things like labor prac-
tices, then citizen critics need an equally robust First Amendment.
That is why we propose, in broad and preliminary outline form,3 °
three corresponding citizen rightsf
* First, a right to criticize corporate conduct freely
without fear of defamation actions, absent some real
showing361 of malice or reckless disregard, even if
the corporation is not a public figure.
" Second, the constitutionalization of anti-SLAPP law
principles 362 to safeguard corporate critics against
abusive defamation suits and related kinds of legal
actions.
* Third, an enhanced and vigorous First Amendment
right to parody and critique corporate entities, prod-
359 NAOMI KLEIN, No LOGO 366 (2000).
36° More, much more, needs to be said about our proposal. Still, for the purposes of this
Symposium, it is enough if we float this idea with the understanding that we may one day revise
or repudiate it.
361 By this, we mean an evidentiary showing far stronger than that given by Suzuki against
Consumers Union. See discussion, infra note 365 and accompanying text.
362 
See generally GEORGE W. PRNG & PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPs: GET-rING SUED FOR
SPEAKING OUT (1996).
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ucts, or communications by a liberal use of their in-
tellectual property, such as trademarked logos or
copyrighted materials, so as to contribute meaning-
fully to public debate. 63
The idea in all of this is to foster dissent to the greatest extent
possible. If the critics of corporations cannot change the structure
of capitalism and the culture it creates, let them at least rail against
corporations and their communications in the hope that it is still
possible to prick the conscience of a nation. By that measure,
those who value the First Amendment owe a peculiar debt to Marc
Kasky, not because he championed censorship but because he de-
fended dissent.
Marc Kasky is an anti-corporate crusader. In California, at
least, such crusaders can wield their ideological axes at the heads
of any variety of corporations-ranging from Exxon to Nestle,
from Disney to Mattel, from Marlboro to McDonalds-and haul
them before "truth commissions." And they can do so without any
fear of business libel or product disparagement suits, since those
Kaskys are private attorneys general. Whatever one thinks about
the evildoings of corporate America-we have our own criticisms
in that regard-it cannot be denied that this promotes a system not
of freedom of expression, but of ideological favoritism. For a
free-speech culture that expects matters of truth to be contested in
the marketplace of ideas, such an ideological use of the courts
smacks of an end-run around the First Amendment.36
Anti-corporate activists following in the footsteps of Marc
Kasky should think long and hard about turning courts into "truth
commissions." After all, the path to the courthouse door is not a
one-way street, open only to the ideologically progressive. As of
363 Compare Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987) (stating that
"trademarks are a form of property, and Mutual's rights therein need not 'yield to the exercise of
First Amendment rights under circumstances where adequate alternative avenues of communi-
cation exist"' (citations omitted)), with Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th
Cir. 2002) (finding that a Danish rock-and-roll band's song "Barbie Girl," parodizing Mattel's
Barbie doll, was not an infringement of the toy company's trademark because the song's title
was relevant to the underlying work and the song did not suggest that it was created by the toy
company; moreover, the song was not purely commercial speech and was, accordingly, fully
protected by the First Amendment), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1171 (2003). Conceivably, a forti-
fied First Amendment right of dissent might exceed even that recognized in Mattel to include
uses of one entity's intellectual property to critique or parody another entity's image, products,
or expressions.
364 Moreover, such suits collide with traditional notions of actionable causes and jurisdic-
tion, both of which have long required plaintiffs to allege some real and personal injury. In this
sense, jurisdictional requirements have buttressed First Amendment values.
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late, corporations armed with product disparagement claims have
become quite accustomed to calling on the courts to determine the
truth or falsity of statements relating to significant matters of pub-
lic importance.
Perhaps the most telling example of that phenomenon is the
recent controversy between the Suzuki Motor Company and the
Consumers Union of the United States, the New York-based pub-
lisher of Consumer Reports.365 When the magazine reported in
1998, based on its test studies, that the Suzuki Samurai "rolls over
too easily," the auto manufacturer sued the public-interest pub-
lisher in federal district court, claiming that it had acted mali-
ciously to damage the reputation of the sport-utility vehicle. Su-
zuki argued that the magazine's test procedures were scientifically
unsound, based on a government report that failed to find the vehi-
cle defective. On appeal from a summary judgment in favor of the
defendant, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
ruled that the case must return to the trial court for a full hearing in
which the jury would weigh the evidence for Suzuki's allegations
that the magazine's driving tests were rigged. The appellate court
refused to reconsider that decision en banc.
Judge Alex Kozinski wrote a thoughtful and stinging dissent,
joined by ten of his colleagues, to complain that "the majority sets
a dangerous precedent., 366 Should Consumers Union be forced to
trial after candidly disclosing its investigative methods, Kozinski
warned, "this is the death of consumer ratings. 367 That Suzuki's
suit might ultimately fail after trial "is little solace to a defendant
crushed by the sheer expense of litigation. 368 On a more funda-
mental level, Kozinski saw the threat to core First Amendment
values in allowing companies like Suzuki to use the courts as truth
commissions: "[C]ourts have no business wading into this scien-
tific feud .... It should be resolved by scientists, policymakers
and consumers, not crushing libel verdicts. 369
What we hope is apparent by this example is the Janus-like
punitive quality of campaigns, designed by activist radicals and re-
activist corporations, to take speech out of the marketplace of
ideas and into the machinations of the law. For every Marc Kasky
365 
The facts relating to the controversy described in this paragraph are documented in Su-
zuki Motor Corp. v. Consumers Union, 292 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir. 2002), panel opinion withdrawn,
330 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2003), reprinted as amended, 330 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2003), and cert.
denied, 124 S. Ct. 468 (2003).
366 330 F.3d at 1113 (Kozinski, J., dissenting), withdrawn, 330 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2003),
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that brings a Nike to its knees, there is a Suzuki doing the same to
a consumer advocate. Without forfeiting our credentials as offi-
cers of the court, we think it salutary that this debate be waged
outside of courtrooms presided over by black-robed judges. It is a
debate that belongs in the court of public opinion judged by people
of all ideological stripes. This, we submit, is one of the lofty
premises of the First Amendment.
That, then, is the story of Nike v. Kasky. Actually, it is but a
foreword to a fuller story, one that unfolds in the articles that fol-
low.

